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Abstract 
 
The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 was an event with a large impact to the 
opportunities of nation building for a country that has followed a difficult path to find 
its national identity. Due to its deep historical roots, its strong national movement in 
the 19th century and its previous experience with sovereignty between 1918 and 1921, 
Georgia had a clearly defined national project before being incorporated into the 
Soviet Union. Even as elites’ visions of nation building have changed several times 
during the tumultuous post-Soviet era, the national project has remained constant. 
Comprising an ambition of closer affiliation with Europe, a more distant relation with 
Russia and control over national minorities, the national project has met an obstacle 
after the 2008 war that challenges Georgia’s further opportunities for nation 
building. Georgian ruling elites, especially since the Saakashvili period, have pursued 
the national project with determination. They have created a strong national identity, 
within which the war has been used to create myths and discourses. The problem they 
are facing in the aftermath of the war is how to continue pursuing this national 
project when premises have changed regarding relations to Russia and the minorities. 
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“Our icon is the homeland 
Trust in God is our creed, 
Enlightened land of plains and mounts, 
Blessed by God and holy heaven. 
The freedom path we've learnt to follow 
makes our future spirits stronger; 
the morning star will rise above us 
and lighten up the land between the two 
seas.  
Glory to long-cherished freedom, 
Glory liberty!” 
The Georgian National Anthem 
Text by David Magradze 
Music by Zakaria Paliashvili 
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1 Introduction 
The war of August 2008 between Georgia and the Russian federation was a 
remarkable event in the history of the Post-Soviet countries. Not only did Russian 
ground forces cross the territory of a sovereign state for the first time since the 1979 
invasion of Afghanistan – it was also a low point in Russian-Western relations since 
the Cold War, and thus a conflict with a certain influence on the global order. On a 
regional level, it sent a clear message to former Soviet countries that Russia still 
demands leverage in its ”near abroad”. From a domestic Georgian perspective, the 
war set new premises for nation building within Georgia that will highly influence 
future possibilities for the Georgians. Representing both what can be seen as the final 
break in a centuries-old, stormy relationship with Russia as well as a truncation of the 
country’s geographical territory, this conflict has shaped new premises and goals in 
Georgian nation building as a part of the elite normative that can be called the 
Georgian national project. 
 
Since its proclamation of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgian 
elites have continuously sought a new, non-Soviet identity to build its nation upon. 
This ideological normative can be seen as a continuation of the nation building that 
led to the 1918-21 Georgian Democratic Republic, as it comprises many of the same 
political objectives:  Establishment of a nation-state based on Georgian ideas of 
nationality, closer alignment with the Western world and a more independent position 
in the relationship to Russia, and integration of minorities into the Georgian political 
system. Different political methods have been used to achieve this normative, and 
different components of the normative have been given priority. It was only after the 
Rose Revolution in 2003, however, that the Georgian national project was followed 
continuously and a comprehensive nation building policy crystallised. 
After the brief but devastating war, Georgia’s opportunities seem to have changed: 
The goal of reintegrating with the secessionist states seems further away than ever, 
considering the fact that large Russian military contingents are still deployed in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian-Russian relations have not seen any significant 
improvement since the end of the war, despite the on-going negotiations in the 
Geneva talks. The Georgians fleeing the conflict areas, 35,000 of whom are living in 
Georgia proper as internally displaced people (IDPs), added to the IDPs from the 
previous conflict and represent a huge challenge for Georgian authorities. Relations 
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with the West are relatively good, but the ambitions of joining NATO and EU seem 
unrealistic at the moment. All these factors seem to gravely complicate the political 
goals of the Georgian governing elite. Is Georgia now becoming ”stuck in the middle” 
of transition, unable to redefine this project? What opportunities remain to carry out 
and complete the national project? 
 
In this thesis I will discuss to what extent the 2008 conflict changed the course of 
Georgian nation building, assuming that it altered the preconditions for elite 
perceptions of Georgia’s future opportunities and its relations to the secessionist states 
and to Russia. These relations, I will argue, are closely linked to the nation building 
process and bear a crucial significance to how Georgia’s national project is perceived 
and carried out by the political elite. I thus believe that the course of events has 
altered Georgia’s possibilities for successful nation building. 
 
1.1 Main research questions 
The Georgian national project is a term coined by Georgian scholar Ghia Nodia. He 
describes it as ”a normative idea expressing the nature of the public order that state 
institutions are expected to define and protect”, and reflecting ”the ambitions of 
different people (or of the elites representing them), as well as the political values, 
ideologies, and orientations prevalent within a society or key parts of it.”1 In several 
of Nodia’s articles, the national project is linked mainly to security issues and to 
issues of reintegration within the country. Furthermore, Nodia argues that the national 
project comprises four “major guidelines” which have been consistent since the 
Georgian Democratic Republic of 1918-21, as well as during the three presidencies 
after independence. These guidelines include the nation-state as the only acceptable 
political framework, Europe as a provider of identity, Russia as a desired neutral 
neighbour but an actual adversary, and an expectation that minorities are loyal and 
respect Georgia’s abovementioned ambitions.2 
If we agree to the consistency of the national project, we still have to acknowledge 
that it has faced some extremely difficult challenges, including seventy years of 
                                            
1Nodia, Ghia: ”Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity”, in Coppieters, Bruno and Robert Legvold (eds): Statehood 
and Security. Georgia after the Rose Revolution. Michigan: MiT Press, 2005 p. 41 
2 Nodia, Ghia: “Components of the Georgian National Idea: An Outline” in Identity Studies Vol.1, pp. 84- 101. 
Ilya State University, 2009, pp. 94-95 
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Soviet occupation, then civil war followed by severe political and social problems. 
The three presidents that have ruled independent Georgia since 1991 may all have 
aimed for the same main goals, but have chosen vastly different political 
interpretations (or methods of nation building) to achieve them. The country has 
achieved much since independence, but the cost of pursuing the national project has 
also been great. A few questions therefore arise as to how important the four major 
guidelines are for the further nation building process: 
How do Georgian elites today envisage Georgia as a complete nation-state without 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia? How will Georgian elites want to position Georgia vis-
a-vis Russia - as a neutral neighbour or an actual adversary? Is Europe in all senses a 
provider of Georgian identity? 
 
1.2 Hypothesis 
On the basis of these questions, then, my hypothesis is that the conflict of August 
2008 has had serious impact on Georgia’s preconditions for nation building for the 
two following reasons: reintegration as a central component of political sentiment, 
and the possibility of a protracted break with Russia. In the reintegration question, the 
war has not only changed the geopolitical rules of the game, but the attitude of 
Georgian elites towards ethnic minorities and Georgia’s ability to solve the conflict 
with the breakaway territories. Regarding Russia, I argue that the war has clarified the 
future of a relationship which has been ambivalent since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
and which for the time being is perceived by elites as openly hostile. This arguably 
gives Georgian nation builders a stronger incentive to affiliate politically, 
economically and culturally with Europe and the United States. At the same time, 
however, it has had a negative effect on democratisation, as this hostility in elite 
discourse is often used to denounce the opposition as Russia-friendly.  
 
1.2.1 Reintegration as a central component 
All political factions in Georgia have, since the internal conflicts of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, been united by the desire to achieve one crucial unifying objective: 
Integration of the breakaway regions Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria. With the 
exception of the latter (Ajaria was successfully and bloodlessly reintegrated into 
Georgia in April 2004, shortly after Saakashvili’s inauguration), the 2008 war has, 
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rendered the ambition of reintegration beyond hope for the foreseeable future, as the 
de facto governments of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now increasingly 
enjoying Russian military protection.3 The conflict between Georgia and the 
breakaway territories has deep historical roots, and has remained unsolved since the 
conflicts erupted in the early 1990s. For all three Georgian  presidents, inclusion of 
minorities into Georgia has been a main goal in which much political – and at times 
military – effort has been put. The eventual failure to reintegrate South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia in 2008, however, has led to a need for different priorities for future nation 
building. Arguably, after the war Georgian elites have put less emphasis on the 
importance of reintegration and at the same time changed their policy towards 
national minorities. Without the possibility of reintegration, the Georgian national 
project has lost one of its central components.  
 
1.2.2 Protracted break with Russia 
The 2008 war started with Georgian artillery shelling targets in and around 
Tskhinvali, capital of the breakaway South Ossetia region. This happened after a long 
period of diplomatic tensions and military skirmishes involving Georgian, Russian, 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian participants. The Georgian attack was followed by an 
unexpectedly strong reaction from the Russian Federation. In the course of a week, 
Russian forces defeated Georgian troops within the South Ossetia region, bombed 
several targets within Georgia and even invaded Georgia proper, before pulling back 
and establishing a number of garrisons in the two breakaway regions. On 26 August 
2008, ten days after a ceasefire agreement had been signed, Russia recognised 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states.4 With these actions, Russia not only 
once and for all took sides in a regional conflict to which it had increasingly related in 
Georgia’s disfavour – also, a long-protracted regional dispute became a matter of 
international concern. The action has severely complicated the relations between 
Russia and Georgia, relations that have been uneven for more than 200 years. Thus, 
                                            
3 In the early months of 2011, extensive military hardware was moved from the Russian Federation to South 
Ossetia, allegedly temporarily and for educational purposes. For a discussion of these movements, see for instance 
this article in Voice of America: http://www.voanews.com/russian/news/georgia/NC-Tochka-U-2011-03-09-
117666753.html (Accessed 24.03.11) or this and related articles in RIA Novosti 
http://en.rian.ru/news/20100808/160117634.html (Accessed 24.03.11). 
4 This initial presentation of the conflict is based on the substantial report from the Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia of September 2009. More detailed perspectives on the conflict and its 
prelude will be discussed in a later chapter.  
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the drastic Russian measures of 2008 excluded the alternative of Russian interference 
in the Georgian nation building process: Russia has, in the minds of Georgian nation-
builders, gone from being an unstable partner to a direct adversary. The prospect of 
returning to a Russia-dominated sphere of influence, where some of the CIS countries 
linger to this day, is now non-existent as far as Georgian elites are concerned.  
 
1.3 Rethinking the trajectory of nation building  
Georgia has a long history of nation building that has its origins in the national 
movements of the late nineteenth century, when the ideological normative of the 
national project was created. I will argue that this normative has been present in all 
stages of nation building attempts: both in the First Republic, or what was known as 
the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG), and later during the various presidencies 
of the Second Republic, which was formed after independence in 1991. The two 
republics have seen extremely difficult challenges: the First Republic was terminated 
after the Soviet occupation in 1921, the Second Republic saw bloody conflicts in the 
first three years of its existence, two out of three presidents have been toppled and a 
war with Russia has been fought. It is still safe to say that the national project has 
survived. The trajectory of nation building, however, has changed with the elites who 
have had the chance to set new goals for Georgia, and with the dramatic events the 
country has gone through.  
 
In this context, my point is that the national project has remained the ideological 
normative of nation building since the emergence of the first national movements in 
the 1860s. The process of nation building, on the other hand, has taken different 
directions. The war in 2008 can be seen as a seminal event regarding the nation 
building trajectory: If elites realise that reintegration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
is out of the question in the foreseeable future, nation building must be rethought, and 
perhaps completely reshaped. At least, one should suppose that the events of 2008 
must call for a ”Plan B” – a Georgian territory no longer including the breakaway 
territories, and Georgia choosing a more distinct path of alignment with the Western 
world. 
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1.4 Methodology and thesis outline 
Working with a range of empirical material, I have chosen a qualitative approach in 
order to make discussions in the thesis as relevant as possible. The main empirical 
material is gathered from reliable sources in news media such as civil.ge and rferl.org, 
independent channels that often refer to official statements by political elites, conduct 
interviews with political actors and critically assess political situations. I have also 
analysed several texts from the pages of the Georgian government, presented on the 
web pages of Georgian authorities. 
Collecting empirical material, I have spent a month working in Tbilisi, conducting 
several elite interviews with politicians, officials and analysts. The main interviewees 
are representatives for the political elite, representatives for the opposition and experts 
on Georgian politics. The ones quoted in this thesis are Irakli Porchkidze, First 
Deputy State Minister for Reintegration in the Georgian government; Tata 
Khuntsaria, Deputy public defender (ombudsman); David Usupashvili, leader of the 
oppositional Republican Party; Alex Petriashvili, political secretary of the Free 
Democrats Party, professor Ghia Nodia at Ilya State University, and Irakli 
Menagarishvili, Georgian minister of Foreign Affairs from 1995 to 2003. In the case 
of all interviews, I prepared interview guides containing relevant questions to the 
persons involved. Their answers have given this thesis an important dimension in that 
they illuminate various sides of contemporary Georgian politics both from the 
governmental and oppositional side, from an analytical perspective and in retrospect. 
Their quotes are spread in different parts of the thesis in order to let them highlight 
discussions in the relevant chapters. 
Furthermore, collecting statistical material has been important to analyse the 
correlation between elite nation building measures and the response of Georgian 
citizens. Although this thesis is written mainly with the elite perspective in mind, a 
view on how the public relate to on-going challenges in Georgian political life is 
valuable to how the government makes its decisions.  
 
The work on this thesis started as an effort to combine theories of nation and 
nationalism with the case study of Georgia. The result has become a discussion 
exceeding the theoretical labels, but knowledge of the most common theories is 
necessary in order to comprehend what is being discussed.  Chapter two clarifies 
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terms often used in the discussion, as many of these terms are understood differently 
and themselves subject of scholarly debate.  
In the third chapter, a historical overview illuminates the birth of Georgian national 
awareness and the development of the national project from the 1850s until the Rose 
Revolution in 2004. Chapter four scrutinises the political landscape in the Saakashvili 
era, and discusses differences in policy before and after the war. In chapter five, 
analysis of elite sentiment shows how the three presidents after independence from 
the Soviet Union have pursued the national project in different ways, but nevertheless 
stuck to the same major guidelines of the national project. In chapter six, the use of 
symbols, heroes and traditions is analysed – and a discussion of Georgia’s 
relationship with Russia shows how Russia fits into the Georgian elite 
conceptualisation of “the other”. Chapter seven points to how the Georgian public has 
reacted to the 2008 war, their perceptions of the elites and what political problems 
they deem as the most crucial.  
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2. CLARIFYING THE TERMS 
2.1 Introduction 
Clarifications seem to be needed when touching upon topics of this kind. Since all 
expressions containing the word nation contain a variety of meanings of both 
intellectual and emotional manner, I find it necessary to define my usage of central 
expressions like nation, nationalism, nation state and nation building. I will also give 
my own interpretation of Georgian scholar Ghia Nodia’s expression national project, 
an expression that I find highly useful in this context.  
 
2.2 Nation 
2.2.1. What and when is nation? 
Starting with a foundational academic debate in the 1980s, several scholars have 
discussed the concept of nation and how it should be defined. What has come out of 
this discussion as existing paradigms is that nation is a relatively modern concept, 
connected to our modern conceptualisation of the state. The former primordialist 
beliefs that a nation can be traced back to ancient history have been replaced by the 
approach that nations first emerged in the modern Western European states, and then 
spread eastward. There are several theories about how and why this happened – the 
debate has seen many approaches that have turned into various schools of 
interpretation. Among the most influential are Ernest Gellner’s theory of modernity, 
explaining the emergence of the nation as a result of the industrial revolution and its 
alteration of social patterns. Anthony Smith, for his part, has argued that there must 
have been communities resembling nations in pre-modern times – he calls these 
communities ethnie, entities sharing certain identity markers such as language, history 
and ethnic origin before modernity.5 
There are also discussions concerning the objectivity of nation, and to what extent the 
concept is an elite construction or something people would share regardless of elite 
efforts to create national awareness. 
 
The Czech scholar Miroslav Hroch has a definition of nation as being  
 
                                            
5 Discussions on these topics are found in Smith, Anthony D.: Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press 2001 and 
Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell 1992. 
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a social group integrated by a combination of [...] objective relationships (economic, political, 
linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective 
consciousness. Many of these ties could be mutually substitutable - some playing a particularly 
important role in one nation building process, and no more than a subsidiary part in others. But among 
them, three stand out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the 
group - or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher 
degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all 
members of the group organized as a civil society."6 
 
For the purpose of this account, I shall stick to Hroch’s definition, as I find it to cover 
many of the gaps left by other scholars: recognising the pre-national identity markers, 
it also approaches the factor of subjectivity and leaves room for the constructivist 
approach.  
 
2.2.3 The Georgian context 
The word nation is troubled in a Georgian context – the country’s relatively small 
population is so diverse in terms of language, culture, history and other national 
identity markers that definitions seem fluctuant. The core of the Georgian conflicts 
can be found in this diversity, and in the fact that the people of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia do not identify with the ”Georgian nation”. So what actually defines a nation 
in this sense? 
 
The languages spoken belong to different branches of the Kartvelian or South 
Caucasian language family (Georgian, Migrelian, Svan and Laz). As Georgia has its 
own branch of the Orthodox Church, religion can be seen as a unifying factor. Then 
again, Ossetians and Abkhazians share religious faith with Georgians, whereas Ajaria, 
which was reintegrated with Georgia in 2004, has a larger Muslim representation.7 
Religion is not, at least from the elite perspective, a problematic dividing issue in 
defining the Georgian identity, and despite some groups’ attempts to present religion 
as the main identity marker, the question of ”Georgianness” has until recently been 
                                            
6 Hroch, Miroslav: "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation building Process in 
Europe," in Balakrishnan, Gopal (ed): Mapping the Nation. New York and London: Verso, 1996: pp. 78-97. See 
especially p. 79. 
7 Toft, Monica Duffy: The Geography of Ethnic Violence. Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2003, p. 109. Based on the 1989 census, Toft estimates 34-42 per cent of 
the population of Ajaria to be (Muslim) Ajarians. 
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linked closer to ethnicity and language than to religion.8 As I will discuss in a later 
chapter, however, the Georgian Orthodox church, with its large influence in Georgian 
discourse, has expressed reluctance against the elites’ acquisition of Western values, 
and increasingly stresses the importance of Orthodoxy as a marker of national 
identity. 
 
In any case, Hroch’s conceptualisation of nation is useful because it offers a 
perspective combining the objective and the subjective: People can share or not share 
a range of objective factors like language, religious belief and geographical position, 
but it is the subjective experience of belonging as an equal member of the group that 
eventually ties people together. Within this subjective experience, shared history is 
shaped into national myths, and identities are made based on imagined likeness with 
other members of the group and differences with the non-members. Whether such 
identities are created by elites or shaped “from below” by groups or communities, 
they can be utilised as tools to include or exclude and to create a feeling of belonging.   
 
In the Post-Soviet context, the word nation carries a complicated connotation. When 
establishing the Soviet Union in the 1920s, the Soviet elite, mainly centralised in the 
Russian urban centres, created a meticulous hierarchy of republics and sub-republics 
with various degrees of autonomy. The basis for these republics was determined 
mostly by Soviet interpretations of ethnic communities and loosely on a historical 
foundation.9 The Soviet Republic of Georgia, emerging from the short-lived 
Transcaucasian Soviet Republic, had no previous history of being a nation-state. 
Nevertheless, as Ronald Grigor Suny argues, “Georgia, like its neighbour Armenia, 
had existed as a state (actually as a number of states) long before the first Russian 
state had been formed”.10 Following Anthony Smith’s definition of pre-modern 
ethnie, Suny points to the fact that Georgia and Armenia, unlike most other Soviet 
Republics, were “historically independent states” with recognisable identities 
consisting of distinctive lingual, religious and territorial features. Moreover, he agrees 
                                            
8 Nevertheless, as suggested by Ghia Nodia, such sentiments exist, particularily among non-muslim Georgians in 
Ajaria, and ”could generate frictions”. Nodia, Ghia: ”Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity”, in Coppieters, Bruno 
and Robert Legvold (eds): Statehood and Security. Georgia after the Rose Revolution. Michigan: MiT Press, 2005 
p. 56-57 
9 Brubaker, Rogers: Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent 
Event. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, p. 17. 
10 Suny, Ronald Grigor: The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1993, p. 58  
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with Smith that such ethnie, despite sharing identity markers of both objective and 
subjective character, must be distinguished from the modern nation: 
 
Though premodern ethnies shared a collective name, a myth of descent, a history, and a distinctive 
culture, though they associated themselves with a specific territory and felt a sense of solidarity, they 
were not as politicized, mobilized, and “territorialized” [identified with clear-cut territorial units] as 
nations in the modern sense are.11 
 
When Georgian nationalist intellectuals started their campaigns for autonomy in the 
late 19th century, the distinct Georgian identity markers were easy to recognise and 
share. Although the elites of the First Republic never had the time to consolidate the 
Georgian nation-state in the short and tumultuous time of their independence, they 
followed the same ideological narrative, or national project, that was pursued in the 
latter days of the Soviet Union.  
 
As nationalist sentiment arose in both the republic and its sub-units in the late 1980s, 
nationality needed reaffirmation and historical legitimacy. Who deserved complete 
independence? Which parameters were to be used to answer that question – Soviet 
ethnofederalism, imperial administration, or various interpretations of ancient history? 
 
 
2.3 Nationalism or national movement 
The word nationalism is in itself problematic as it could easily be loaded with 
normative political content. Scholars disagree not only on what this expression should 
mean – for many, nationalism represents an ideology, yet others see it as a movement. 
Anthony Smith has defined nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining 
and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its 
members deem to constitute an actual or potential ’nation’”.12  The most common use 
of the word is within this category – nationalism seems to be defined as an ideology, a 
social or political movement, or in the nation building sense. Hroch, going against the 
grain in this case, limits the use of nationalism to what he calls its “original” sense: a 
collective mentality “that gives priority to the interests and values of one’s own nation 
                                            
11 Suny 1993, p.59 
12 Smith, p.9 
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over all other interests and values”.13 Hence he interprets the word in a negative way, 
as a term indicating national chauvinism. For the purpose of this thesis, since terms 
will often be discussed in the analysis of several scholars, I will not limit the term 
nationalism to Hroch’s strict use. Still, Hroch’s nation forming theory will be 
presented in this sub-chapter rather than in the one about nation building, because this 
early process is more about national movements and national awareness – essentially, 
nationalism – than nation building, which I consider a process that is initiated within 
the independent nation-state. 
 
Miroslav Hroch has divided the formation of modern nations into processes, the first 
being the “early modern” state-nation (France, the Netherlands, Sweden), where 
ruling elites set the premises for nationality – and the second among the ’smaller 
nations’, beginning “under conditions of at non-dominant ethnic group, i.e. a group 
which formed an ethnic community and whose members possessed a greater or lesser 
degree of ethnic identity”.14 This category, he argues, shared a lack of a ruling class, 
statehood and a continuous literary tradition, but did contain a group of intellectuals 
who started seeing their community as belonging to the category of nation. These 
intellectuals started national movements which with the aim of waking up the 
‘unconscious’ nation – that is, the non-dominant ethnic group that was perceived as 
having a right to become an independent nation-state. Regarding the use of terms, 
Hroch argues that “the term ‘national movement’ has a significant advantage over 
‘nationalism’ in that it refers to empirically observable activity by concrete 
individuals”, and proceeds to explain how these movements shaped their discourse 
and influenced their communities during three phases of their work: 
 
At the beginning of the national movements there was activity which was above all devoted to 
scholarly inquiry into and propagation of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social, 
economic and historical attributes of the non-dominant ethnic group (Phase A). In the ensuing 
period, Phase B, a new range of activists emerged, who now sought to win over as many of 
their ethnic group as possible to the project of creating a modern nation, by patriotic agitation. 
                                            
13 Hroch, Miroslav: ”Nationalism and National Movements: Comparing the Past and the Present of Central and 
Eastern Europe” , in Nations and Nationalisms 2 (1), 1996, p. 36 
14 ibid. 
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Once the major part of the population came to set special store by their national identity, a 
mass movement emerged – Phase C.15 
 
Although the theory is meant to apply to national communities within multinational 
empires in Eastern Europe, Hroch does not mention Georgia in particular. However, 
the similarities between the periodisation described above and the social and political 
development in Georgia in the last half of the 19th century should be clearly visible. 
Suny also supports this view:  
 
Without an unnecessarily rigid application of Hroch’s model, it is possible in a discussion of 
the formation of the Georgian intelligentsia to trace a similar evolution - from the initial 
revival of the Georgian past and attention to the language in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries through the journalistic activity of the 1860s and 1870s to the active 
political nationalism of the turn of the century.16 
 
Hroch stresses the importance of distinguishing national identity, created by agitation 
in Phase B, and ethnic identity, a simpler form of identity that could exist within a 
multinational empire without agitation or mobilisation. National identity, according to 
Hroch, is more complex: an identity that possesses a social composition including 
national elites, and a community of citizens enjoying equal rights. It also 
“acknowledges a body of ‘higher culture’ in the national language” and has a 
subjective feature in that it combines “an awareness of a common origin with an 
awareness of common destiny, to create a historical ‘personalised’ collectivity”.17 
 
Hroch’s way of analysing the emergence of national movements in the late 19th 
century has been recognised by other influential students of nationalism, especially 
those of the constructivist school, who stress the “invention of tradition” perspective 
and the active role played by intellectual elites in national movements. Scholars like 
Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm have also pointed out that the term nationalism “is 
a principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”.18  
                                            
15 Hroch, Miroslav: “The Nature of the Nation”, in Hall, John A. (ed): The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and 
the Theory of Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 94-95 
16 Suny, Ronald Grigor: The Making of the Georgian Nation. London: IB Taruris 1989, p. 119. 
17 Hroch 1998, p. 96 
18 Gellner, p. 1, and Hobsbawm, Eric J.: Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme. Myth. Reality. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 9-11. Hobsbawm stresses that although he agrees with 
Gellner in that nationalism derives from modernisation and thus is constructed ‘from above’, he criticises Gellner 
for not paying ‘adequate attention to the view from below’.  
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The emergence of new nation-states in Eastern Europe in the early 20th century was 
the result of national movements creating national awareness among ethnic 
communities. In Hroch’s argumentation, national movements in countries of the old 
Eastern empires gained momentum as a result of such mobilisation processes, where a 
demand for national independence coincided with class or centre/periphery 
struggles.19 The first phase of the Georgian national project, as described above, fits 
well into the description offered by Miroslav Hroch of national movements in Eastern 
European countries in the 19th century. Here, national mobilisation followed a three-
phased development starting with intellectuals acquiring an interest in native 
languages and historical myths, gaining momentum as national awareness became 
politicised and ended with nation-wide mobilisation. As one of the crucial 
preconditions for successful mobilisation Hroch described the emergence of a 
nationally relevant conflict, a social tension that mobilises not only intellectuals 
demanding language rights, but also workers against manufacturers and peasants 
against landlords representing an elite outside the national group. National 
movements thus mobilised people from “several classes and groups”. Therefore, 
according to Hroch, this mobilisation cannot be reduced to a class struggle: it was this 
combination of national agitation and popular mobilisation in phase C that led to 
successful nation forming in many countries.20 Regarding Georgia, however, it might 
seem that this final stage of mass mobilisation required more than national awareness. 
Suny argues that during this final stage, the emergence of Marxist and socialist 
movements inspired by the Russian populists, was the reason for this mobilisation by 
the end of the nineteenth century.21  
 
2.3.1 National movements after the Soviet Union  
In the case of Georgia, a relatively strong national sentiment remained in educated 
circles during Soviet times. Therefore, as I will argue, there is a clear continuity 
between the national project that Georgian intellectuals embarked upon in the late 
                                            
19 Hroch, Miroslav: ”An Unwelcome National Identity, or What to do About ”Nationalism” in the Post-
Communist Countries?” in Hroch: Comparative Studies in Modern European History. Nation, Nationalism, Social 
Change. Aldershot: Varorium 2006, IX pp. 269-70. 
20 Hroch, Miroslav: ”From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation”. New Left Review  no.198 1993, p. 12 
21 Suny 1989, pp. 179-181 
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nineteenth century and the sentiments that drove the circles around Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia to power in the late 1980s.  
 
Hroch argues that there are similarities between the national movements emerging in 
the nineteenth century and those coming out of the Soviet republics in the 1980s.22 
Both movements occurred in times of crisis where there was a need for a new group 
identity defined by a ‘personalised’ nation, an ethnic homogeneity within ‘historical’ 
borders where those not sharing lingual, religious and ethnic similarities are 
considered outsiders. Especially in the post-Soviet space, language became a strong 
marker of national identity, defining the ‘nation’ within the borders of the former 
republics.23 There are, however, differences which explain the outcome of the post-
Soviet national movements and the ensuing conflicts: in the times around the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, national movements did not have to create a new national entity, 
but could restore the previous one created before Soviet rule. Moreover, the social 
structures have changed – where 19th century intellectuals from non-dominant ethnic 
groups had to keep with the value system they were a part of, post-Soviet elites took 
advantage of the power vacuum that ensued after the collapse without obligation to 
answer to any existing norms or traditions.  
 
Hroch also highlights a change in the nationally relevant conflicts: whereas these 
conflicts during the pre-Soviet era were linked to industrialisation and economic 
growth, the post-Soviet conflicts were a response to “short-term depression and 
decline”, providing a different psychological effect which made it easier for agitators 
to blame ‘the others’. Most importantly, the increasing availability and intensity of 
social communication and the role of mass media have accelerated communication 
processes and facilitated proliferation of information to the masses, so that new elites 
can “manipulate populations, to distort or intensify [how] they portray conflicts of 
interests where they do not exist, that is, to promote or diminish the danger of 
aggressive nationalism”.24 
In those post-Soviet areas where armed clashes erupted, tensions concerning national 
identity were at the core of conflict. As new elites grasped power, historical myths 
                                            
22 Hroch 1996, p. 39 
23 Hroch 1996, p. 40 
24 Hroch 1996, pp. 41-42  
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and other national markers were re-constructed with a greater intensity than before, 
sharply defining out-groups and ‘enemies’.  As Russian scholar Valery Tishkov 
points out, 
 
the constructivist approach pays special attention to mentalities and language as key symbols 
around which a perception of ethnic distinctiveness crystalizes. For example, written texts and 
speeches contain historical reconstructions which are used to justify the authenticity and the 
continuity of one or another ethnic identity […] Political and heavily ideological archaeology 
and ethnography have flourished for decades in the academies – central and peripheral – of 
the former Soviet Union. What is new is that unprecedented battles to ‘reconcile the past’ with 
new political agendas are taking place with far greater ferocity and insulting language than 
during times of censorship and limited publishing opportunities.25 
 
I will argue that this was particularly true during Gamsakhurdia’s rule: Gamsakhurdia 
himself was a scholar who used academic arguments to reconstruct Georgian history 
and create a polarised identity.  
2.4 Nation-state 
What has been discussed in the previous sub-chapter is the subjective aspect of 
nation, which makes people feel united with common identities. Another aspect is that 
of state-society relations, or how elites structuralise the nation into what Anthony 
Giddens defines as “the pre-eminent power-container of the modern era”: The nation-
state.26 As various students of nation and nationalism have pointed out, the concept of 
the state, defined by Weberian features such as monopoly on legitimate violence – in 
addition to a bureaucracy, division of labour and civic participation, has to coincide 
with an idea of a geographically limited area where markers of national identity (such 
as language, ethnicity, religion and history) are shared by the group of people living 
there. This contrasts with the multinational state: the empires that crumbled in the 
early twentieth century, and that comprised several non-dominant ethnic groups or 
nationalities ruled by one dominant group. 
 
Studies of nations and nationalism are to a great extent focused on finding the 
congruence between the concepts of state and those of nation. The prominent scholars 
                                            
25 Tishkov, Valery: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame. London: 
Sage publications, 1997. p. 13. 
26 Giddens, Anthony: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, ii: The Nation-State and Violence. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 1985, p. 119. 
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on the topic disagree as to when and how these concepts converged, but there is a 
consensus that the term nation in the meaning nation-state is a modern phenomenon 
that emerged with The French Revolution.27 As previously mentioned, most scholars 
agree that there is a correlation between the concepts of state and nation, and that a 
criterion for a nation is at least to have state aspirations. I will not take part in these 
general discussions, but rather illuminate some points about the Georgian case: using 
Smith’s language, Georgia has a strong ethnie identity, sharing pre-national attributes 
such as the Georgian-Orthodox church, a history of statehood and relatively defined 
borders, and a literary language. When national movements started spreading in the 
19th century, a national movement emerged boasting pre-national attributes and 
defining the concept of a Georgian nation-state. National movements in the late 1980s 
picked up this concept again. The concept of a Georgian nation-state is a central 
guideline of the Georgian national project, which is pursued to this day.  
 
2.5 National project 
In his article Components of the Georgian National Idea: an Outline, Georgian 
scholar Ghia Nodia offers a highly interesting account on Georgian attitudes towards 
nation building. He describes the subjective and objective ideas of nation as ‘platonic’ 
and non-platonic’, meaning that the ‘platonic’ ones are impossible to construct or 
deconstruct – they are there, but can be reconstructed or reinterpreted by elites. 
Among the key ‘platonic’ ideas of nation, he mentions markers of identity (language, 
history, religion, traditions); the political project (the task of preserving or expressing 
national identity); the image of the other or the out-group (In Georgia’s case, 
detachment from the imperial master); role models (other nations who have already 
completed their nation building) and the internal other (minorities).28 
 
 Nodia then goes on to define the normative idea he calls the national project, defined 
by the following elements:  
 
1) The Georgian nation-state is the only acceptable political framework for the development 
of the Georgian nation; 
 
                                            
27 For extensive discussions of these topics, see accounts by Smith, Gellner and Hall (ed).  
28 Nodia 2009, pp. 86-88 
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2) Europe or the West in general (these two terms are not conceptually divided) serves as the 
provider of a larger (framework) identity, as the role model, and the presumed ally. This 
means that: 
(a) By its essence, Georgia is part of Europe, it should be recognized as such and be part of 
main institutions of the West such as NATO and the European Union;  
(b) the West serves as a blueprint for the construction of the Georgian state - that is, it is only 
legitimate as a democratic state. If it does not fully conform to this normative framework yet, 
it is on the way to doing so; 
(c) the West is Georgia’s main friend, ally, and protector. 
 
It is interesting that Nodia highlights how ‘the West’ is a term applied to both USA 
and Europe – it suggests that to Georgian elites, the concept of the West is a 
stereotype of modernisation, economic efficiency and protection from the Russian 
threat. The remaining two points, describing Georgia’s relation to Russia and national 
minorities, read as follows: 
 
3) Russia should be just another neighboring country with whom Georgia should have 
friendly though not preferential relations. In fact, however, it is the main 
adversary, as it tries to undermine the Georgian state through direct intervention or through 
exacerbating internal Georgian problems (see the next point). 
 
4) Georgia is a tolerant country that accepts and recognizes culturally distinct ethnic 
minorities on its territory but demands from them loyalty to the Georgian national project as 
defined above. Granting them territorial autonomy is undesirable 
but acceptable if necessary. The presence of minorities may become a challenge to it (as it is 
the case for any country) but Georgia is fully capable of handling this unless outside actors (in 
practice - Russia) deliberately infuse tensions.29 
 
Nodia describes the national project as unfulfilled, and says that these guidelines have 
been invariable since the start – “despite all the differences between the first Georgian 
republic of 1918-21 and the post-Soviet period as well as important differences 
among the political regimes of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and 
Mikheil Saakashvili”.30 
 
This model is helpful because it depicts a normative idea which has been followed for 
a long while, and which has been reproduced to become a normative ideology for all 
Georgia’s elites. However, it seems that this national project has been more clearly 
defined during Saakashvili’s presidency – he has explicitly followed the guidelines of 
the national project, and even used the term “Georgian project” to describe his 
ideological framework.31 Slightly simplified, it could be said that Gamsakhurdia 
pursued nation building exclusively, Shevardnadze concentrated on state building – 
and Saakashvili has managed to do both. 
                                            
29 Nodia 2009, p. 94 
30 Nodia 2009, p. 95 
31 The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili’s speech delivered at the ceremony dedicated to Russia-Georgian 
war anniversary”, from the official site of Georgia’s Presidental Administration, 12 Feb 2009. 
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2.6 Nation building and the role of elites 
Just like nation and nationalism, nation building is an expression with a range of 
different meanings. It is common to see nation building as opposed to state building – 
two processes that may be closely linked, but may differ in many ways. American 
scholar Francis Fukuyama means that both expressions comprise the building of state 
institutions and framework, but whereas state building is a project owned by the 
state’s own elite, nation building is a project carried out by an outside power, such as 
American military and political involvement in contemporary Afghanistan.32 
More commonly, however, scholars tend to describe state building as the formal, 
institutional and administrational construction within a state, while nation building is 
a process in which national identity is consolidated.33 I find this a reasonable 
separation of two on-going processes because it also says something about relations 
between state and society: Whereas state building is a matter of how elites construct 
and formalise a state, nation building can be a more inclusive process – or at least a 
process in which participation of non-state groups and individuals take place. Nation 
building is primarily undertaken by elites, however – theirs is the privilege to 
construct, re-invent, highlight or downplay identities connected to the nation. 
Language, religion, cultural traditions, unifying symbols and historical myths are used 
to make the individual citizen feel close to the national community.34 This is more 
than true in the Georgian case: for the casual visitor as well as for the scholarly 
observer, a strong national identity is clearly visible in the way old literature is 
cherished, in the way traditions of music and food are preserved also in modern times, 
in the large devotion to the Georgian-Orthodox church and in the way historical 
myths are manifested in popular discourse. 
 
For the purposes of this account, I define nation building as the political consolidation 
of the national project. Therefore, I will use national project as the overarching idea 
or concept that was established with the first national movements in the 1860 and has 
remained more or less unchanged to this day, and nation building as the term for how 
                                            
32 Fukuyama, Francis: State Building. Governance and State Order in the 21st century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press 2004, pp. 50-52 and 131-40. 
33 Kolstø offers a substantial discussion of this matter in Kolstø, Pål: ”Strategies of Symbolic nation building in 
new states: successes and failures” (essay 2009) 
34 Coakley, John: ”Mobilizing the Past: Nationalist images of History” in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10:4, 
2004, pp. 535-539 
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this project has been concretely pursued by elites at different times of modern 
Georgian history. I will argue that nation building was started, but aborted in the short 
period of independence in 1918-1921, that it was picked up again in 1991 and then 
lost priority in the mid-1990s, and finally that it was pursued successfully after the 
Rose Revolution in 2003. The discussion as to how the 2008 war has affected the 
possibilities of nation building, then, will be related to how essential Russia and the 
breakaway states are to this process.  
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3. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Georgia’s statehood in modern terms is quite young. However, the roots of Georgia’s 
origins can be traced back to the kingdoms of Colchis and Iberia in late antiquity, and 
to the renaissance under David the Builder and Queen Tamar in the 12th and 13th 
century. Since these historic ”golden ages” are easy to define and place within a 
geographical area, and since a strong tradition for a unique alphabet and literary 
language was already in place, Georgian national movements never faced difficulties 
finding grounds for national awareness and playing on nationalist sentiment in the 
19th century.35 With a heritage of language and historical myths already established, 
the Georgian way to nation building was closely interlinked with memories of the 
past.36 Georgia lost its pre-national statehood at the outset of the 19th century: its 
incorporation in the Russian empire in 1801 could be seen as a trade-off where 
national identity was traded not only for security, but also for contact with European 
culture. After the integration into the Russian Empire in 1801, Georgia was presented 
to modernity by Russian soldiers, intellectuals and civil servants. While influencing 
Russian culture and becoming an important part of Russian national identity, people 
from the Caucasus were still seen as ”wild” and often romanticised in Orientalist 
fashions, displayed in literature and official sentiment as different and more primitive 
than ethnic Russians.37  
 
In this chapter I seek to highlight events in modern Georgian history that illustrate the 
troubled road of nation building. A meaningful discussion of Georgia’s contemporary 
national project requires a review of the longer lines of history, because Georgia 
seems to have gone through previous phases of the national project, or three processes 
of nation building: The first, starting in the 19th century and following the trajectory 
                                            
35 Nodia, 2009, p. 86 
36 King, Charles: The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. Oxford: University Press, 2008 p. 179 
37 For a good account on this orientalist description, see King, pp. 106-118: Here, Semyon Boronevskii, alexander 
Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov and Leo Tolstoy are named as the authors describing “the unruly south” during the 
19th century (p. 108) 
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of several other Eastern European states at the time, culminated in the formation of 
the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918, only to be aborted by Red Army 
occupation in 1921. The second, starting in the late 1980s and facing a violent end 
1993, had to be downplayed in trade for stability later in the 1990s. It came back with 
the Rose Revolution in 2003, only to fail with the defeat in the 2008 war. The defeat 
and its consequences will be discussed more thoroughly in later chapters.  
 
3.2 Integration into the Russian Empire  
The story of Georgian-Russian relations starts with the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783. 
Signed by Empress Catherine the Great of Russia and King Irakli II of Kartli-
Kakheti38, the treaty offered much-needed military protection to a vulnerable kingdom 
squeezed between three mighty great powers. Identifying more with Orthodox Russia 
than with the Muslim Persian and Ottoman empires, Irakli felt it natural to seek 
Russian protection and was willing to make his kingdom a protectorate of the Russian 
empire. However, when tensions with the Ottomans requested Russian troops 
elsewhere, the Russian garrison in Irakli’s capital Tiflis (called Tbilisi after 1936) was 
withdrawn. In 1795, encouraged by the absence of Russian troops and eager to punish 
their unstable Western neighbours, the Persians under Agha Mohammed Khan sacked 
Tifilis. This led to Irakli’s successor, Georgi, pleading that Kartli-Kakheti be 
incorporated into the Russian empire. Catherine’s successor Paul I saw this as an 
opportunity of expansion, and in January 1801 annexed the territories, ”ignoring pleas 
for continued rule by the Georgian dynastic line”.39 
Thus, the relationship between the two countries began with military neglect and 
forced annexation. At the same time, the Russian presence brought modernity to the 
Caucasian territories, and exported romanticised perceptions of Caucasian culture 
back to the courts of St. Petersburg and Moscow. Under the reign of viceroy Mikhail 
Vorontsov (1845-1854) Tbilisi was rebuilt and expanded, and the relationship 
between the viceroy and the Georgian gentry was cordial.40 The social relationships of 
the time were still complicated: the gentry were economically poor, and had fewer 
resources than the class of Armenian bourgeoisie, who were strongly represented in 
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39 Jones, Stephen F.: Socialism in Georgian Colors. The European Road to Social Democracy 1883-1917. 
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the cities as manufacturers and merchants. With the gradual coming of 
industrialisation, Georgian peasants started moving to the cities throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, making out the poorest societal segment. This was the 
backdrop upon which the young, Russian-educated Georgian intellectuals started 
longing for a cultural language of their own and incorporating elements of 
romanticism into their literary texts.  
 
3.3 The first phase of the national project 
The ambivalence in the Russian-Georgian relationship played an important role in the 
formation of modern Georgian society. As Georgian young nobles were introduced to 
modern education and European political ideas in Russia from the early nineteenth 
century, sentiments about Georgian national identity started occurring with the 
intellectual movement called Tergdaleulni, “those who have tasted the waters of the 
river Terek”. The name indicated that these scholars had tasted the waters of the 
Terek, the river that runs between Georgia and Russia.  Taking their inspiration 
mostly from Russian oppositional movements, the emerging national movement was 
exposed to different ideas on how to conduct the national project. By the 1870s, 
currents of nostalgic, language-based nationalism competed with more politicised 
ideas of reformism and liberalism, in addition to socialism and Russian-inspired 
populism.41  As we shall see, these currents in turn created a mass mobilisation 
opposing Russian rule as well as the Armenian middle class, resulting in a nationally 
relevant conflict that saw Georgians united for different reasons. The mobilisation 
was complex, driven by a range of different factors and impulses, comprising 
agitators from various strata. It started out, however, as a typical example of Hroch’s 
phase A, with a group scholars developing an” awareness of the linguistic, cultural, 
social and sometimes historical attributes of the non-dominant group”.42 
 
3.3.1. The three waves from the Terek 
Georgia’s national awakening in the late 19th century can be compared to that of 
several Eastern European countries in the sense that Georgian language, literature and 
history issues were part of a collective memory and pride. The close interaction with 
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Russia had not deprived Georgians of their national myths, and when Georgian 
intellectuals started creating sentiments about national awareness in the 1850s, this 
stirred feelings among the educated gentry.  
Since Georgian elites were incorporated into the Russian elite network, not all of 
them had the urge for national freedom. Georgian gentry could often be partners of 
the further Russian expansion in the Caucasus, and Georgians took part in the 
political and societal life in the Russian capitals.43 It was not until concerns were 
raised about the status of Georgian language that intellectuals in the country – also a 
part of the “russified” upper classes – started protesting. Writers and activists such as 
Ilia Chavchavadze and Akaki Tsereteli were among the most important men behind 
the national movement emerging in the 1860s: They were both noblemen with the 
Russian title of Knyaz’  (prince) attached to their names, and they both received their 
higher education at the University of St. Petersburg. Their publications, however, 
ranging from essays and satirical short stories to epic poems and historical texts, 
strongly propagated Georgian independence and the use of Georgian language in 
literature. Chavchavadze, having been inspired by Giuseppe Garibaldi and other 
European nationalists that he had heard about in St. Petersburg, became an activist 
upon his return to Georgia in 1861. He also became a leading figure of the first wave, 
in Georgian pirveli dasi, of the national movement. During the 1870s, a second wave, 
meore dasi, emerged: intellectuals like Niko Nikoladze and Giorgi Tsereteli broke 
with Chavchavadze’s nostalgic and romanticised nationalism, and worked more 
actively to maintain Georgians in prominent societal positions.44 
 
The works and agitation of the two movements hit an emotional string within the 
Georgian gentry. Soon a broader movement of intellectuals started combining interest 
in their ancient history and language with European ideas of national identity and 
independence. Known as the Tergdaleulni, the members of the first and second waves 
of Georgian nationalist intellectuals had all got their education and knowledge of the 
modern world from Russia. Although many of them visited Europe, their intellectual 
heritage was Russian. Their viewpoints were coloured by Russian interpretations of 
liberalism since they saw Russia as a gateway to Europe. At the same time, their 
relationship to Russia was ambivalent – the national awakening did stem from the fear 
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that Russian rule and western ideas would undermine Georgian culture. As Suny puts 
it: 
 
“[...] contact with Russia and the West worked to awaken consciousness of Georgia’s unique 
culture and fears that Georgia would be overwhelmed by foreign values, by Russian political 
practice and by the alien economic operations of Armenian middlemen. This ambivalence 
toward “Europeanization” and Russian rule was a constant feature of Georgian intellectual life 
through the nineteenth century into the twentieth”. 45  
 
The mesame dasi or third wave of the national movement was even more politically 
distinct, and acquired more response outside the salons of Tbilisi. Younger Georgian 
intellectuals, born and raised in the countryside and inspired by Russian populists and 
by foreign thinkers like Victor Hugo and Karl Marx, started publishing material 
where demands for national autonomy were linked to agitation for peasants’ rights 
and protection of the growing urban proletariat. In the early 1890s, writers Egnate 
Ninoshvili and Mikheil Tskhakaya formed this third wave, a literary group with 
socialist affiliations, which soon metamorphosed into a radical political 
organisation.46 The combination of this interest in political modernisation and the 
steadily-growing demand for linguistic and national independence proved fertile, and 
unlike movements in western parts of Europe where the groups supporting class 
struggle and nationalist sentiment were opposed to each other, these groups – at least 
for a short while – successfully overlapped in fin-de-siècle Georgia, as they did in 
other parts of Eastern Europe, particularly with nations belonging to multinational 
empires. 47 
 
3.3.2 The three waves in a theoretical perspective 
From Chavchavadze’s earliest works in the 1860s until the end of the nineteenth 
century, Georgia’s national mobilisation can be described as a textbook example of 
Hroch’s theories and stands comparable to the development of several other Eastern 
European national movements. However, the development of the strong Menshevik 
movement in the early twentieth century, and its strongly socialist discourse, was an 
unexpected turnout.  
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There were particular reasons for Georgian socialists to combine class struggle with a 
national project. Although Georgian revolutionaries were connected to the Russian 
Social Democratic party, Georgian socialism had a much stronger nationalist 
component than its Russian counterpart. Inspired by the Tergdaleulni and by 
European Marxist thinkers such as Otto Bauer, Georgian Social Democrats were 
concerned about the national question and much more aware of questions concerning 
the peasantry.  
In his book Socialism in Georgian Colors, English/American scholar Stephen F. 
Jones argues that Georgia’s path to socialism was marked by a higher degree of 
nationalist struggle and anti-colonialism, and therefore enjoyed a much more unified 
support than did the socialists in Russia.48 Joined not only by the urban workers who 
often toiled in Armenian-owned factories, but also by the peasants and many of the 
impoverished nobles, Georgian socialism developed into a movement closer to 
Russia’s Menshevik faction than to the Leninist Bolsheviks. 
German scholar Christoph Zürcher, on the other hand, finds the class and national 
identity struggles to be incompatible, and illustrates this by describing the relationship 
between Georgian labourers and Armenian industry owners. Pointing out that ”the 
Armenians constituted the middle class, and [...] the Georgian nobility had long been 
integrated in the Russian service nobility”, he proceeds to conclude that ”the Georgian 
national movement lacked a social basis because the workers and the rural population 
were drawn toward social democratic ideas more than toward national projects”.49 
Zürcher here fails to recognise that Social Democracy in this period was still closely 
associated with national independence movements in many countries. Austro-
Marxism had since the late 19th century combined Marxist ideals with alternative 
perceptions of nation and nationality, and in other multinational empires, social 
democratic ideas indeed had close links to national projects. This coincides with 
Hroch’s nationally relevant conflicts to the extent that Georgia’s struggle for national 
autonomy acquired support from the masses in a struggle of centre vs. periphery, 
peasants vs. landowners, workers vs. manufacturers. As the nineteenth century drew 
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to a close, Georgia’s national project was freezing into its forms: a combination of 
national and class awareness. 
 
3.3.3 Political violence, war and revolution 
From the turn of the century, and especially in the aftermath of the first Russian 
Revolution in 1905, political movements in Georgia became increasingly radicalised. 
Bad harvests and growing industrialism forced a steadily growing amount of peasants 
to leave the countryside and settle down in the cities, leading to explosive urban 
population increases.50 The new urban workers proved to be a trustworthy base of 
recruitment for the Georgian branch of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ 
Party, an Empire-wide organisation established in 1898.51 The unrest of those years 
bears close similarities to the political violence seen in other parts of the Empire: 
Terrorist actions against the regime followed by acts of repression, radicalised but 
also increasingly factionalised Marxist movements, and violence among the various 
oppositional factions. Chavchavadze, who was elected representative of the first 
Russian Duma in 1907, was assassinated near Mtskheta after the first Duma session, 
allegedly in a joint operation by Bolshevik and Menshevik activists including Sergo 
Orjonikidze, who was later to become a Soviet Politburo member.52 The murder of 
the popular nationalist led to Bolsheviks losing support, whereas Mensheviks, who 
supported a Russian Duma, were not placed under the same suspicion. 
The dominating elements of the revolutionary movement maintained nationalist 
elements in their agitation. The few Georgian revolutionaries who opposed inclusion 
of the bourgeoisie in the revolutionary planning and discredited national autonomy 
would have to find their credentials elsewhere.53 This was very much the case for 
Iosef Djugashvili (Stalin), who left Georgia in 1907 and lost touch with the Georgian 
revolutionary movement. Later to occupy a central position in the Russian Bolshevik 
movement, both he and Orjonikidze would prove pivotal in determining the formation 
of the Georgian SSR after 1921. 
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3.5 The first Georgian Republic, 1918 - 1921 
On 26 May 1918, as civil war raged in post-revolutionary Russia, the Democratic 
Republic of Georgia (DRG) became a reality. Led by Menshevik politician and 
activist Noe Jordania, the Republic was under control of a movement with more 
popular support than what was the case in Bolshevik Russia. Largely spared the havoc 
of the Great War, Georgia now embarked on the completion of its first national 
project. 
The foundations for the republic had been laid already the previous year. After the 
February revolution, the Imperial Viceroy Nikolay Nikolaevich left Tiflis, and a 
special Transcaucasian committee (Osobyi Zakavkazskii Komitet, Ozakom) was 
established on behalf of the interim government. This committee had little leverage, 
and just like governmental institutions in Russia, it was subject to immense pressure 
from the more radical opposition. Meeting none of the national demands made by 
Georgian parties, the Ozakom was undermined and rendered ineffective.54 In the 
meantime, the Georgian-Orthodox church resurrected its autocephaly, and Georgian 
intellectuals came back from their European exiles to start the cultural revival of the 
country.55  
Despite its strong internal support, the republic was threatened from all sides. Initially 
receiving German support, Jordania’s government must have regretted the 
capitulation of Germany in November 1918. British troops dispatched to the Caucasus 
to oversee the Ottoman keeping of the armistice also deployed in Georgia, but 
withdrew in 1919 once oil and transportation links were secured.56 Jordania’s 
government faced attacks from the Bolshevik underground movements in the 
countryside, and blockade from White Army units controlling the North Caucasus 
regions. Nevertheless, a functioning state was created and institutions rapidly installed 
to meet the challenges. Military expenditures were sky-high, and diplomats worked 
tirelessly at the Paris peace conference to obtain recognition. This was in fact 
achieved: Moscow and Tbilisi signed a treaty granting Georgia de facto recognition in 
January 1920 and de jure the subsequent year. There was no time for celebration, 
however: In February 1921, Red Army units flushed into Georgia from the North, 
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East, and South. Just like their neighbouring states Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia 
was forcibly denied national independence.  
The invasion was not only a defeat for Georgian sovereignty, but also a setback for 
moderate socialists in Europe who disagreed with the brutal conduct displayed by the 
Red Army. The German Marxist and anti-Bolshevik Karl Kautsky, who had travelled 
through Georgia in the summer of 1920 to ”study an interesting and important social 
experiment”, condemned the invasion. In a book published shortly after the invasion, 
he described the Democratic Republic of Georgia as well functioning despite the 
country “being more backwards than Russia”, and lamented that the process of 
building the republic was ”brutally interrupted by the Russian neighbour and 
competitor”.57 
It should be pointed out that during the civil war, clashes erupted between the DRG 
and opposition in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who disapproved of the lack of 
autonomy they were given in the new state. Feeling a stronger affiliation with the 
Russian Bolsheviks than the Georgian Mensheviks, Abkhazians and Ossetians did not 
take part in the Georgian national project. True, Georgian garrisons in Abkhazia 
fought against the Red Army invasion in 1921, but Ossetian Bolsheviks, feeling 
ethnically and politically repressed, also rioted regularly against the Menshevik 
government in the time of the Republic.58 When Gamsakhurdia declared the 
restoration of DRG in 1991, this triggered negative feelings within the Abkhaz and 
Ajarian ASSR and the Ossetian AO. 
 
3.6 Soviet ethnofederalism  
The concept of Soviet ethnofederalism is closely linked with the recent conflicts in 
Post-Soviet Caucasus. Described by some observers as a system deliberately designed 
to establish a centralised regime of divide and rule, the argument has been that 
ethnofederalism was a means to organise territorial authority, legitimise this authority 
by granting the nations some de jure rights while taming the nationalist forces 
awakened by revolution.59 This view, however, is disputed and lacks dimension. 
Other scholars have described ethnofederalism as an institutional accommodation 
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applied in the early days of the Soviet Union, as a temporary measure that only 
gradually made nationality an official component of the citizens’ personal status.60 In 
the ethnic patchworks of the new Soviet territories, defining and consolidating 
nationality became a pivotal instrument in order to create functioning political 
entities. The Soviet authorities adopted the concept of nationality (natsional’nost’) 
both as an ethno-cultural/lingual community and as a political entity belonging to a 
defined territory. Even when subordinated to the supranational idea of a Soviet 
identity, national identity was always clearly defined by the Soviets, most visibly 
through the ascription of every citizen’s nationality in personal passports. Thus, 
instead of containing a deliberate divide and rule policy, ethnofederalism made 
possible a type of national identity that, with the arrival of glasnost’ and larger 
opportunities of political action, created strong sentiments and demands for national 
independence. This, in turn, caused the breaking-up of the Soviet Union into 15 new 
nation-states, whose borders had already been drawn by the early Soviet 
ethnofederalists.61  
 
3.7 The construction of the Georgian SSR 
Constructed as an asymmetrical federation, the USSR was a hierarchy of federal units 
with different status: Soviet Socialist Republics (Sovetskie Sotsialisticheskie 
Respubliki - SSR) were the highest in the hierarchy. The 1936 constitution not only 
granted such status to the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis and the Georgians, who had 
been forced together in a Transcaucasian SSR since 1922 – it also underscored that 
their sovereign rights would be protected by the USSR.62 Although these rights were 
rather limited by a list of decision powers vested in the higher organs of the Soviet 
Union, the SSRs had some sovereign rights, and would for instance consist of sub-
units like autonomous republics (Avtonomnye sovetskie sotsialisticheskie respubliki - 
ASSR) and autonomous regions or oblasts (avtonomnye oblasti - AO). The ASSR 
was subordinated to the SSR, and contained smaller ethnic groups. In Georgia, 
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Abkhazia and Ajaria were granted ASSR status. South Ossetia was proclaimed an 
AO.63 
Josef Stalin, himself a Georgian, can be dubbed the founding father of Soviet 
ethnofederalism: He served as a People’s Commissar of nationalities’ affairs between 
1917 and 1922, and it was indeed he who signed the 1936 constitution. Georgians 
were well represented in the Soviet nomenklaturas both centrally in the USSR and 
within Georgia: Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Lavrenty Beria were both close allies of 
Stalin. More recently, Eduard Shevardnadze, the country’s second post-Soviet 
president from 1995 to 2003, had risen from a long-standing post as First Secretary of 
the Georgian Communist Party to Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union before 
entering the political stage of Post-Soviet Georgian conflict.  
Still, Russian-Georgian relations, also in Soviet times, contained an element of 
perpetual antagonism. The breakaway regions, on the other hand, enjoyed better 
connections with Kremlin: Abkhazia, a rich region regularly visited by Soviet 
political profiles and officers, felt closer to Moscow than to Tbilisi, and the Abkhaz 
supreme soviet as well as protesters and leading intellectuals on several occasions 
pleaded Moscow to restore the autonomous status they possessed between 1921 and 
1931. For Ossetians, a reunification with North Ossetia was always a desired 
outcome.64 
 
3.8 Fighting and secessions – the eruption and freezing of conflicts  
In spite of its modest size and population, Georgia was a notable Soviet republic 
known for its rich soil, opportunities of tourism, and for a vibrant cultural and 
intellectual life.  Popular riots in Tbilisi on two occasions showed that there was a 
limit to what Georgians would accept within the Soviet framework. Khrushchev’s 
1956 denunciation of Stalin led to massive riots in Tbilisi, leaving 15 dead and 
hundreds wounded. Moreover, in April 1978, when the Georgian Supreme Soviet 
decided to change the constitutional status of Georgian language in the draft of a new 
constitution, new riots erupted. Then-party boss Eduard Shevardnadze finally 
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discarded the draft, siding with the protesters and recognising the power of language 
as an identity marker and “the potency of Georgian nationalism”.65  
 
When glasnost in the mid-1980s allowed national movements to re-emerge, it was no 
surprise that these gained support in Georgia. The ensuing violence, however, was 
hard to predict. The period between 1989 and 1993 saw three internal wars: One over 
the breakaway AO of South Ossetia (1989-92), one over political power in Georgia 
proper (1991-93) and one over the former ASSR of Abkhazia (1992-93). The cost of 
the wars was devastating: Up to 13 000 people were killed, and more than 200 000 
fled their homes and ended up in protracted displacement.66 How could this happen in 
a country which, contrary to many of the other post-Soviet states, had actual 
experience with nation building and modern statehood? 
 
3.8.1 The Growth of Georgian Nationalism 
In 1988, following trends from Armenia and the Baltic republics after Glasnost’, 
national movements started to appear within the Georgian intelligentsia. Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava, two dissidents from Georgian intellectual circles 
who had been imprisoned by Soviet authorities, formed the Society of St. Ilia the 
Righteous, named after national hero Ilia Chavchavadze who had been canonised the 
year before. Other movements, like the National Independence Party and the National 
Democratic Party, were also founded as nationalist sentiment gained momentum and 
demands for secession and autonomy grew louder.67 Their goal was to create a nation-
state for the Georgian people free from Russian rule, and thus re-establish the 
Democratic Republic of Georgia. Gamsakhurdia’s nationalism targeted Soviet 
authorities and national minorities alike, and was voiced through slogans like 
”Georgia for the Georgians”, a truly absurd polemic in a country with a highly 
differentiated population and with a long history emerging from two divided 
kingdoms.68  The movements facilitated the organisation of mass demonstrations and 
protest rallies. Unlike the movements leading to the Democratic Republic of Georgia, 
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the nationalist groups now congregated against socialist rule. This nationalism was 
not affiliated with any specific political ideology, but was primarily focused on 
promoting Georgian sovereignty.69 Socialism at this stage was seen as a political 
ideology connected with Soviet rule. The Georgian communist party, still the leading 
political institution, was quickly undermined by Gamsakhurdia’s movement, losing 
trust and popularity as nationalist sentiment rose. As the communist party’s 
legitimacy dwindled, the minorities in Ossetia and Abkhazia started fearing they 
would be excluded from the political process.70 
One incident was a turning point in stripping the communist party of legitimacy, and 
in radicalising the Georgian nationalist cause: The 9 April tragedy in 1989. On 
request from Georgian party authorities, Soviet troops were dispatched in Tbilisi to 
disperse a massive demonstration against increased Abkhaz autonomy. The ensuing 
tumults left 19 young demonstrators dead and hundreds wounded.71  
Gamsakhurdia’s popularity grew when he used harsh language against Soviet leaders, 
Communist Party apparatchiki and ethnic separatists. Meanwhile, hostilities also 
grew between the various ethnic groups of Georgia. This polarisation of discourse 
arguably made leaders in the regions feel further disconnected from the Georgian 
national project and closer to Soviet authorities. The leaders of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Ajaria saw relations with the Soviet Union as a bulwark against Georgian 
hostility, and as a provider of stability in an increasingly destabilised Georgia. Not 
only were Gamsakhurdia’s rhetorics becoming more aggressive, but it also became 
clear that he was not in control of the nationalist movements emerging. Especially 
threatening was the Mkhedrioni, an irregular paramilitary group led by Jaba Ioseliani, 
a former bank robber and playwright. With a weakening state under pressure from an 
increasingly militant and powerful national movement, the stage was set for a series 
of conflicts that would completely disrupt the elites’ plans for successful nation 
building. 
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3.8.2 War with Ossetia 
Ossetians are an Iranian-speaking people that settled on the Northern and Southern 
side of the Caucasus Mountains between the 11th and 15th century. Since the 
Russians annexed the northern part of Ossetia as early as 1774, it came to be seen as a 
part of Russia proper. The southern part, incorporated along with Kartli-Kakheti in 
1801 and separated from the north by the Caucasus Mountains, was considered 
Georgian territory. Over the years, the Ossetians established better relations with 
Russia than with the Georgians. These relations led to the establishment of an 
Ossetian AO in the Soviet constitution.72 Once the Soviet Union started crumbling, 
disagreements between the Georgian Soviet Republic and the Ossetian AO gained 
momentum. Following Georgian struggles for independence in 1989, a war of laws 
deteriorated into violent conflict. 
It started with the Georgian Supreme Soviet passing a law that made Georgian the 
only official language in Georgia. The Ossetian Regional Soviet answered by passing 
a law declaring Ossetian the only official language in the Ossetian AO. They also 
pleaded with Moscow to raise their status to ASSR. This prompted Gamsakhurdia, 
who now had more influence on the Georgian masses than the Georgian authorities, 
to direct a group of 30,000 demonstrators to Tskhinvali, where they clashed with 
Soviet security forces. Having been denied by the Georgian Supreme Soviet to take 
part in the parliamentary elections in 1990 – under a newly passed law saying that 
regional parties could not participate – Ossetian politicians claimed the region a 
Democratic Soviet Republic. The Georgian government, which after the 
parliamentary elections contained a majority from Gamsakhurdia’s party, responded 
with a blockade of South Ossetia. In addition, Gamsakhurdia deployed his newly 
established National Guard, which harassed the civilian population.73 
The conflict dwindled during the spring and summer of 1991, when Gamsakhurdia 
declared Georgia an independent state. This happened on 9 April 1991, on the second 
anniversary of the Tbilisi massacre. Gamsakhurdia, holding an emotional speech at 
the occasion, was elected president with 86 per cent majority. In September, however, 
Gamsakhurdia’s National Guard entered South Ossetia, wreaking extensive havoc in 
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the Tskhinvali region but facing fierce resistance from Ossetian militias. The conflict 
drew into a stalemate as turmoil spread to Georgia proper. By the time Russia 
intervened to enforce a ceasefire agreement in June 1992, Gamsakhurdia was no 
longer in office, and the battles were fought between Georgians – on Georgian 
territory.  
 
3.8.3 Internal conflicts and the ousting of Gamsakhurdia 
Despite the large support for Gamsakhurdia’s presidency in the elections, the 
Georgian national movement was deeply split. The failed attempt of using violence to 
stop South Ossetia from seceding showed the military weakness of the President’s 
National Guard, and Gamsakhurdia made some bad moves: after attempted coup 
d’état in Moscow in August 1991, he approved of the putschists’ request to 
incorporate the National Guard into the Soviet Interior Ministry. Ioseliani, the 
Mkhedrioni commander, resisted and turned against Gamsakhurdia. Ioseliani was 
supported by Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua and former National Guard commander 
Tengiz Kitovani. In December 1991, after winning much of the National Guard’s 
support, the opposition besieged the parliament building and forced Gamsakhurdia 
into exile. Retreating to Armenia and later to Chechnya, the former president 
organised armed groups in his native Samegrelo to attack Tbilisi. A bitter civil war 
ensued, bringing the battles to the Georgian heartlands. Admitting their inability to 
find a way out, Kitovani and Sigua asked former Soviet foreign minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze to come back and find a solution. Shevardnadze inherited a country in 
total chaos. From his arrival in March 1992, when he was appointed Head of State 
Council, Shevardnadze had to keep a balance between the armed secessionists and the 
unruly paramilitary bands fighting under the banners of the National Guard and 
Mkhedrioni. After several unsuccessful attempts both to negotiate and to crush his 
enemies with military force, Shevardnadze turned to Russia for help. 
 
3.8.4 War with Abkhazia 
The demonstration leading to the 9 April 1989 tragedy had actually started as a 
protest against Abkhaz demands for autonomy. Abkhazians were a concentrated 
minority in the region and had sought greater autonomy both during the Democratic 
Republic and in Soviet times. However, no direct claims for independence had been 
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made before Georgia under Gamsakhurdia started showing force and Russia started 
actively supporting the Abkhazian side.74  
The Abkhaz are an ethnic group with a distinctly different language than Georgians. 
Some of them also converted to Islam in the 17th and 18th century. They are thus 
linguistically and to some extent religiously distinct from Georgians. During the 
Soviet period, discussions arose in Georgia about to what extent the Abkhaz had the 
right to claim Abkhazia their homeland or whether they had displaced Georgians 
formerly living there.75 This rhetoric was sharpened after Gamsakhurdia came to 
power.   
As previously mentioned, leaders of the Abkhaz ASSR had tried a number of times to 
break with the Georgian SSR and become a part of the Russian Soviet republic 
instead. When faced with increasingly outspoken demands for Georgian 
independence from 1988, authorities of the Abkhaz ASSR feared becoming a mere 
province in independent Georgia. In March 1989, a petition was signed by 20,000 
people including Communist Party members, for Abkhazia to be granted status as an 
SSR. Georgian nationalists, fearing a situation similar to Nagorno-Karabakh in 
Azerbaijan, staged massive demonstrations against Abkhazian autonomy – the one in 
Tbilisi being the largest demonstration in the city’s history.76  
Despite initial clashes, a violent Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was avoided as long as 
Gamsakhurdia stayed in power, and a sort of power brokering ensured that Abkhaz 
politicians had a certain influence in Georgian politics. When Gamsakhurdia was 
ousted and Kitovani’s military junta in Tbilisi claimed that the Democratic Republic 
of Georgia was restored, the Abkhaz interpreted this as a deprivation of the Abkhaz 
ASSR’s independent status, since it had no autonomy in the DRG.77 Failure in the 
negotiations between Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba and Georgia’s new 
president Shevardnadze led to Tengiz Kitovani taking control and leading his troops 
into the Abkhazian Gali area, in a move against Abkhaz separatism. War ensued, with 
Kitovani’s troops facing a band of paramilitaries not only from Abkhazia, but also 
from sympathisers in the Russian part of Caucasus and other places. It has also been 
claimed that elements of the Russian military, most likely officers operating outside 
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their official mandates, contributed in the clashes.78 Shevardnadze, initially backed by 
Yeltsin’s government, began to suspect that Russia actively supported the Abkhaz 
side with weapons and other military equipment. Although this was strongly denied 
by the Russian Ministry of defence, Shevardnadze in early 1993 did said he did not 
doubt that “certain circles” in Russia supported Abkhazia’s attempts to reoccupy 
Sukhumi.79 
 
3.8.5 The Aftermath – Russia’s role as peacekeeper 
Ironically enough, Shevardnadze had to turn to Russia in order to stop the wars. By 
late 1993, the country’s national project was in shambles: Shevardnadze, having tried 
to regain control of the situation in Abkhazia, had to flee Sukhumi to save his life and 
called for Russian intervention to stop a counteroffensive from Gamsakhurdia’s 
forces. Gamsakhurdia, facing utter defeat after an unsuccessful attempt to march on 
Tbilisi, was found dead under unclear circumstances outside his hometown Zugdidi.80 
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali were lost, and Russia’s demands for stepping in as a third 
party turned out to be tough: Shevardnadze, who had still avoided membership in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the organisation’s foundation in 
1991, had to sign up. A protocol of friendship and peace that was signed with Russia 
was never ratified by Russia, after the Duma disagreed with Russia’s stated obligation 
to build up the Georgian military and the intention on giving the UN status as a 
broker. Duma members claimed that training Georgian soldiers could be perceived as 
fuelling Georgian aggression by de facto governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, 
and that letting the UN taking part in the brokering would undermine the role of the 
CIS.81 Normalising its relations with Georgia and acquiring Shevardnadze’s support 
for the 1994 war in Chechnya, Moscow nevertheless nurtured special relations with 
Sukhumi and through its peacekeeping mandate established a durable influence in 
Georgia. 
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3.9 Shevardnadze’s time of troubles 
Gamsakhurdia’s attempt to pursue the national project failed horribly. By the end of 
1993, Georgia had succeeded in becoming an internationally recognised sovereign 
state, but had also endured military losses in two chaotic campaigns that led to 
refugee problems, lasting animosity towards the breakaway states, and a dependence 
on Russia that would prove hard to break away from. Albeit rid of communist rule, 
the country suffered greatly from political instability, militancy and horrible crime 
waves. Shevardnadze, who was formally inaugurated in 1995 and served two 
presidential periods, had to cope with enormous political and social problems. It 
seems that he sought to stabilise relations with Russia more than pursuing the 
ambitions of reintegration. But as the first Russian-led peacekeeping battalions started 
patrolling the de facto borders in June 1994, Shevardnadze continued parts of the 
Georgian national project: Constructing a nation-state with a functioning political 
system. Order was restored and Shevardnadze’s careful ways of dealing with Russia 
and the de facto governments provided stability. However, both his decision to make 
Georgia a member of the CIS, the continuing Russian influence on the secessionist 
states, and the Russian success in excluding other actors from entering the stage in the 
Caucasus did little to quell the speculations that Shevardnadze’s attitude to his former 
colleagues in the Kremlin was rather servile.82 It should be taken into consideration, 
however, that it was under Shevardnadze that Georgia started to free itself from 
Russian quasi-domination and establish closer ties with the USA. These ties included, 
in addition to economic aid, the so-called Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), 
a military cooperation programme established in 2002 to enhance the capabilities of 
the Georgian army to handle a potential terrorist threat. Moscow, already having 
accused the Georgian government of hiding Chechen separatists in the Pankisi Gorge 
on the border to Chechnya, reluctantly had to accept American military presence in 
Georgia.83  
With both American and Russian soldiers on their soil, it is safe to say that Georgian 
security matters were complicated in this transitional period.  Moreover, faced with 
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flourishing corruption and seemingly unable to do anything to reintegrate the 
breakaway areas, Shevardnadze’s support decreased dramatically during the late 
1990s. When in 2003 the governmental budget deficit was so high that half of 
Georgia’s population lived under the poverty level, the discontent with Shevardnadze 
was so palpable that the opposition had an easy time stirring revolutionary 
sentiments.84 On 23 November 2003, after protests ensuing a rigged parliamentary 
election, he was ousted by former party colleagues in what came to be known as the 
Rose Revolution. 
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4 THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE UNDER SAAKASHVILI 
2004-2008   
The Rose Revolution of November 2003 marked a significant change of pace in 
Georgian nation building. Representing a relief from the stagnant situation that the 
country found itself in from the late 1990s, the new government pursued the national 
project in a much more proactive manner and continued to seek close relations with 
the west. However, the war in 2008 set ambitions back and created a new situation in 
which Georgia lost some of the pace in the nation building process. 
This chapter seeks to analyse factors that from Saakashvili’s inauguration in January 
2004 made Georgia’s elites continue on the national project. I will also argue that the 
2008 war presented an obstacle on this path that has changed its possibilities. Rather 
than a historical overview, this chapter is more analytical. I will concentrate on two 
things in particular: the political changes chosen by the new regime to actively pursue 
the national project, and the ways in which the war has altered the possibilities of 
pursuing it.  
 
4.1 The new political system 
4.1.1 The Rose Revolution and the pre-war period 
The Rose Revolution, so called because the peaceful demonstrators used roses as a 
symbol to show their non-violent intentions, was the first in a series of “coloured” 
revolutions in the Post-Soviet space. Seeming like a wave of democracy sweeping 
over a territory dominated by old and corrupt Soviet apparatchiki, these revolutions 
gained popularity among Western journalists and decision-makers. However, the rosy 
picture painted by the young, energetic and US-educated new president was not 
without flaws. Scholars have pointed out that a strongly presidentialist system was 
implemented, particularly at the expense of the judiciary. Moreover, main media 
facilities (notably broadcasters) have largely been taken over by the state.85 The 
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revolution itself has also been criticised, and the question has been raised as to 
whether it was necessary to topple Shevardnadze by unconstitutional means, when he 
was obviously in a lame-duck position and would most likely have been out of office 
in the planned 2005 presidential elections.86 In his strongly biased but highly readable 
account, Georgian-American strategic consultant and former opposition lobbyist 
Irakly Areshidze contends that  
 
this revolution was the worst possible outcome for Georgia because it inevitably closed the country’s 
third democratic opening [the two other being 1989-1992 and 2001-2003 respectively], while 
Saakashvili’s constitutional changes set Georgia’s political developments back by at least a decade.87 
 
Some of Saakashvili’s reforms have been successful: battling corruption and 
reforming the police, fighting organised crime and successfully integrating Ajaria are 
measures which have arguably had a fortunate effect on Georgian society. The 
economy grew substantially between 2004 and 2008, and the administration even 
managed to buffer the potentially disastrous consequences of double economic crisis 
due to the war and the global financial crisis.88 During the first years in office, the 
new Georgian government, which was full of young, dynamic and Western-educated 
officials, received applause from Western decision-makers, scholars and press. 
Although few went as far as president George W. Bush and calling Georgia a ‘beacon 
of liberty’, there seemed to be little doubt that Georgia was on its way towards 
democratisation and a place in the extended Western community.89 
 
The political development seemed to stagnate after a few years, when political 
disagreements caused a schism within the elite itself. After the incidents in the 
autumn of 2007, in which former Minister of defence Irakli Okruashvili was arrested 
and a subsequent protest rally fiercely cracked down upon, western observers started 
doubting the intentions of the regime that the West had so actively been endorsing.90 
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Regarding reintegration, the new government chose a very proactive stance towards 
Georgia’s unsolved security issues. While Shevardnadze had a more containment-
oriented approach to the breakaway states and Russia, the government that emerged in 
the wake of the Rose Revolution was clear in its ambitions to carry on the national 
project. Still basing its legitimacy upon the constitution adopted under Shevardnadze 
in 1995, Saakashvili’s government made several amendments and adopted a number 
of decrees and laws to fulfil its ambitions. Notably, a range of new ministerial posts 
with cabinet status were established: The State Ministry for Euro-Atlantic integration 
was created early in 2004, followed by the State Ministry on Diaspora issues and 
State Minister for Reintegration with Saakashvili’s second presidency in 2008. The 
position of reintegration minister was initially taken by Temuri Yakobashvili, who 
was the architect of the document called State Strategy on Occupied Territories: 
Engagement Through Cooperation, launched in 2010.91  
This document, including a comprehensive action plan, includes a number of soft 
power measures and focuses mainly on the non-Georgian population in Abkhazia. 
Seeking to build confidence between the Georgian government and the various 
citizens in certain Abkhaz regions, the action plan boasts free healthcare and 
education to those who cross the border. As I will discuss in a later chapter, the actual 
efforts made to engage the populations in the breakaway states have been limited by 
the war in 2008.  
4.1.2 Ajaria and the “near miss” in South Ossetia 
In terms of reintegration, it is safe to say that Saakashvili has come closer to define 
and pursue the major guidelines of the national project than his predecessors, and that 
he has succeeded in combining nation building and state building. Although the goals 
have not changed, Georgia’s ability to achieve these goals increased after the Rose 
Revolution.92 It turns out, however, that the president’s ambitions to reintegrate all the 
breakaway regions before the end of his first term would not be fulfilled. 
The successful reintegration of Ajaria into Georgia proper was a great victory for the 
Saakashvili government. Like Abkhazia, Ajaria was an ASSR enjoying a certain 
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autonomy during the Soviet Union. Unlike the other autonomous regions, however, 
Ajarians are ethnic Georgians and had no national project of their own by the time 
they could have seceded.93 The former regional leader, Aslan Abashidze, was member 
of the old Soviet nomenklatura.  
 
The success in Ajaria sparked hopes among Georgian elites that it might be possible 
to reintegrate South Ossetia as well. Here, however, the pretext and methods were 
rather different. Using a crackdown upon smuggling and contraband as a pretext – 
illegal import from Russia was indeed a nuisance and a threat to the Georgian market 
– the project that was launched in the spring of 2004 was a combination of soft power 
measures and military pressure.94 It failed to serve its intended purpose, and instead 
fuelled hostilities between Ossetian de facto leaders and Georgian officials. 
Negotiations were severely hampered, and a possible opportunity for reintegration 
was missed.  
 
Another attempt by Tbilisi to execute leverage on South Ossetia was the 2006 
installation of a Tbilisi-loyal administration for the Georgian settlements in South 
Ossetia in territories under Georgian control under the leadership of Ossetian ex-
prime minister Dmitri Sanakoev. This move was not well received, neither by 
Moscow nor the Ossetian de facto government, and it culminated in May 2007 when 
de facto president Eduard Kokoity shut all roads leading to the Georgian-dominated 
settlements in South Ossetia and threatened with armed resistance. Interestingly, 
Moscow intervened to stop the escalating conflict.95  
 
4.2 The prelude to war 
In the course of 2007 and 2008, hostilities increased between Georgia and Russia. As 
Russian warplanes violated Georgian airspace several times and diplomatic relations 
worsened – in particular with the Russian embargo on Georgian goods in 2006 
rendering wine producers void of a market – Georgian elites looked forward to 
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becoming a part of NATO, as had been a part of the main foreign policy goals for a 
long time. After the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, Saakashvili was so 
sure of this being a fait accompli that he called the conditional Membership Action 
Plan (MAP) a “technical issue”.96 However, as the weeks went by, the obvious 
reluctance of several NATO members to provoke Russia by admitting Georgia into 
the organisation made the process stall. At the same time, Russia’s president Vladimir 
Putin, apparently as a reaction to the international recognition of Kosovo two months 
prior, instructed the Russian Ministry of foreign affairs to pursue cooperation with 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto governments, “within the frames of trade and 
economic, social, scientific and technical fields, as well as in the spheres of 
information, culture and education”.97 
The summer of 2008 saw further diplomatic disagreements and even armed 
skirmishes between Georgians and Ossetians within South Ossetia. The war 
nevertheless came as a surprise, at least to the international community. 
 
4.2.1 Who is to blame? 
Undoubtedly, in every war the discursive dichotomy of aggressor and victim plays a 
significant role. The party rightfully claiming to be the victim can more easily 
legitimise its actions in the course of war, and can take the moral high ground. 
Arguably, the role of victim can also be used effectively in creating a national myth to 
unify the nation – the outcome notwithstanding. If the attacked party is victorious, the 
myth can be constructed upon how the nation bravely defended itself when facing the 
aggressor, and then won a rightful victory. This discourse is visible in the former 
Soviet, now Russian, celebrations of the victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. If the 
victim is vanquished, the story can be built into a myth about suffering and slavery 
under the yoke of the enemy, or create strong emotions of antagonism towards the 
other, which can be said about the way the Russian-Georgian war is depicted by 
Georgian elites.98 
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It might be difficult to obtain fully neutral accounts on the 2008 conflict.  
The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 
(IIFFMCG), appointed by the Council of the EU in 2008, delivered a report in 
September 2009 based on thorough research. The statement describing the start of the 
conflict reads as follows: 
 
On the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, a sustained Georgian artillery attack struck the 
town of Tskhinvali. Other movements of the Georgian armed forces targeting Tskhinvali and 
the surrounding areas were under way, and soon the fighting involved Russian, South 
Ossetian and Abkhaz military units and armed elements.99 
 
Indicating that the Georgian side thus initiated the war, the report then addresses 
allegations that the Russian army was prepared for the attack: 
 
Georgian claims of a large-scale presence of Russian armed forces in 
South Ossetia prior to the Georgian offensive on 7/8 August could not be substantiated by the 
Mission. It could also not be verified that Russia was on the verge of such a major attack, in 
spite of certain elements and equipment having been made readily available. 
There is also no evidence to support any claims that Russian peacekeeping units in South 
Ossetia were in flagrant breach of their obligations under relevant international agreements 
such as the Sochi Agreement and thus may have forfeited their international legal status. 
Consequently, the use of force by Georgia against Russian peacekeeping forces in Tskhinvali 
in the night of 7/8 August 2008 was contrary to international law.100 
 
The report was received with fury in the Georgian administration, and with mixed 
comments in Moscow. Russian officials and politicians complained it failed to 
mention US participation, while blaming Russia for escalating the conflict.101  
In the aftermath of the report, several academic texts have offered accounts in order to 
provide insight into the question. While scholars like Johanna Popjanevski and Andrei 
Illarionov argue convincingly that the Russian side actually did prepare for a war with 
Georgia and crossed the Georgian border before Georgian artillery started shelling 
Tskhinvali, other accounts have done nothing but revealing the political importance of 
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being righteous in the matter.102 In that sense, books like “A Little War That Shook 
the World” by the late Ronald Asmus showed blatantly how important this war of 
discourse is, not least for Washington. In his book, internal conflicts within Georgia 
are hardly mentioned, and American doubts about including Georgia in NATO 
strongly downplayed. Russia is one-sidedly depicted as the aggressor, and the book 
reads as an attempt to blame European reluctance for the West failing to aid Georgia 
in the war.103  
 
Among Georgian elites, the war has become an important milestone in defining the 
Georgian national myth. The myths created after the war depict the Georgian people 
as brave and heroic, defending its territorial integrity when attacked, and not losing 
because this is a war without winners. The Russian side is blamed not only for the 
aggression, but also for the hostile takeover of political power in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. At a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the war on 7 August 
2009, Saakashvili made an emotional speech mentioning the names of several people, 
military personnel and civilians alike, who were killed during the war. He put the 
entire blame on Russia for seeking to “destroy Georgia’s freedom, democracy and 
statehood” and then elaborated: 
 
After a long embargo, economic blockades, provocations, bombardments, threats, boycotts 
and other rough but finally not successful pressures, the old KGB followers decided to finish 
the so-called “Georgian Project”, our common attempt to create a modern, European, 
democratic, successful state in the Caucasus.104  
 
The use of myths in Georgian elite discourse will be thoroughly discussed in a later 
chapter. Suffice it to say here that Georgian elites have done what they can to create a 
discourse contrasting their own tireless efforts towards Western-styled democracy 
with the dark backwaters of authoritarianism and belligerence that Moscow want to 
drag them back into. 
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4.1.3 Towards democracy or still in the post-Soviet orbit? 
Nevertheless, there is reason to ask whether the current political system is really 
moving in the direction of Western-styled democracy. Charles Fairbanks has argued 
that Saakashvili’s methods of ruling –including the keeping of a “Potemkin-village 
opposition”, control of media and the absence of Rule of Law - are reminiscent of 
tactics used by Soviet leaders, and that this “combination of a leftover Soviet reality 
[…] and a novel Western institution (private property) has proven particularly toxic to 
democracy”.105 
To strengthen this point, an example can be given from the aftermath of the anti-
governmental riots on 26 May 2011. On the next day, the Georgian Ministry of 
Interior released “secretly recorded” material depicting among others opposition 
leader Nino Burjanadze, her husband and her son, all recorded while planning a 
violent coup where loss of lives would be accepted in order to topple the president.106 
In a comment, Saakashvili claimed he was principally against “broadcasting police 
recordings obtained in the process of investigations”, but said that in this particular 
case it had been very helpful. He also made it clear that such measures could be 
defended when “we know Russia is behind it”.107  
 
This legitimisation of unlawful behaviour as long as the end justifies the means has 
occurred on some occasions during Saakashvili’s two presidential periods, but 
increasingly after August 2008. Similar conduct during the protests in the spring of 
2009 and in May 2011 shows that the experience of the 2008 war has done little to 
soften the government’s attitude towards oppositional protest. Saakashvili, in order to 
legitimise excessive use of force and unlawful surveillance, has alleged that the 
opposition serves as a fifth column for Russia’s secret services.108 Arguably, it has 
become easier to defend such allegations after the war: the horrors of war are still 
fresh in people’s memory, and when Russia is depicted as threatening the very 
                                            
105 Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.:”Georgia’s Soviet Legacy” in Plattner, Mark F. & Larry Diamond (eds) Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 21, Number 1, January 2010. Washington DC: Josh Hopkins University Press, p. 150. 
106 “Statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs”, released on Ministry of Internal Affairs homepage 27 May 
2011.http://police.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=2511. Accessed 9 June 2011. 
107 “Saakashvili: Fifth Column Operates Openly in Georgia”, article in Civil Georgia 27 May 2011. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23538. Accessed 9 June 2011. 
108 “The Georgian Political Landscape After May 26”, article on RFERL’s Georgian Service 8 June 2011. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus_report_georgia_political_landscape_after_may_26/24228715.html 
Accessed 9 June 2011. 
56 
existence of the Georgian national project, citizens may be more tolerant towards the 
use of extreme measures such as covert surveillance, arbitrary arrests and excessive 
use of force.  
 
Still, in my own experience, people’s views are highly different in this regard. 
Interviewing a number of people in Tbilisi about the legitimacy of the opposition after 
the May 2011 riots, I received answers ranging from approval of the government’s 
heavy-handed measures, through disappointment in the radical opposition for 
cooperating with Moscow, to angry denouncement of the whole government.  A 
number of people also said that they wanted relations with Russia restored, and that 
they did not approve of the official hostility to their neighbour, with which they felt a 
certain solidarity. 109 
 
One might give Fairbanks a point in his suggestion that in the Georgian government’s 
behaviour, some methods have survived from the Soviet past. However one should 
not be tempted to make any further comparisons between Saakashvili’s administration 
and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the political elite has skipped one generation, 
and consists almost entirely of young, western-educated people who bear little 
resemblance to the nomenklatura that survived throughout the Shevardnadze era. 
With an average age of 37.5 years (June 2011), Georgian ministers represent a 
segment much more oriented towards cooperation with the West than the other 
Caucasian countries. Nevertheless it can be argued that the elite is highly exclusive in 
the way it is constructed by the president’s inner circle: ministers are often replaced, 
leaving few with more than a year of experience.110 Division of power strongly 
favours the executive, and the parliament consists of a majority from Saakashvili’s 
party. The 2011 decision to move the Parliament to Kutaisi, some 200 kilometres 
away from the capital, also suggests a weakening of the legislature.111 
In its pursuit of fulfilling the national project in all its aspects – a modern, European 
nation-state mastering its territorial integrity – the Saakashvili administration passes 
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bills and consolidates decisions at such a speed that the opposition feels neglected and 
excluded.  As David Usupashvili, leader of the oppositional Republican Party 
remarks: 
 
Pluralism and democracy is an obstacle to these grandiose ambitious reforms of the ruling 
elites. [The] ambition is not only to change mentality of the Georgians, [but] to develop a new 
kind of men and to change the landscape of the country as well. I mean, for instance this 
moving of the Parliament from Tbilisi to Kutaisi, which only has justification from the 
government side, [claiming] that they are trying to decentralise the country politically. They 
are saying that, but can we recall any example of a president that by moving parliament 
somewhere to a different city than the capital, was the main road to political decentralisation? 
Of course, this is absurd! And what is really needed for political decentralisation, to give real 
power to the parliament and to the judiciary, to media, to empower local self-governance 
bodies, nothing like that is happening there. Even the smallest issues, like what colour 
different buildings should have in Gori and in Batumi, are decided somewhere in 
Saakashvili’s room.112 
 
There seems to be a danger in the ruling elites not allowing the opposition a say in 
political issues. Studying the opposition and its alternatives to the current pursuit of 
the national project gives us valuable insight in political tendencies outside elite 
circles, and can provide an answer to why they are not allowed a voice in the political 
game. 
4.2 Opposition and political pressure 
Opposition politicians have used varying rhetoric when criticising Saakashvili’s 
reintegration efforts. It can be said that this rhetoric is different after the 2008 war 
from what they were before, something that reflects the government’s position on 
solving the problem. In 2007, when the government for the first time encountered 
fierce resistance from former allies of Saakashvili, the opposition’s stance was that 
the president had done too little and been too weak and indecisive to reintegrate the 
breakaway states. Irakli Okruashvili, who served as Minister of defence and Minister 
of interior until his arrest in September 2007, alleged publicly that Georgia had been  
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“only a step away from reclaiming one of our lost territories if it were not for the president’s 
incapability, weakness and inability to take a political and historical decision, as he was afraid 
of losing power.”113  
 
The most radical part of the opposition is formed by some of Saakashvili’s former 
allies, notably Okruashvili and former speaker of parliament Nino Burjanadze. After 
breaking with the government and forming their own parties in 2007, they have both 
been sharp critics of Saakashvili’s politics. Burjanadze has criticised the president’s 
handling of post-2008 relations with Russia and called for a dialogue with Russian 
authorities. By fellow members of her party, Burjanadze is presented as a “diplomat” 
able to solve the disputes with Russia avoiding the use of force.114 Apparently, her 
association with Vladimir Putin and her numerous travels to Russia have done little to 
quell Saakashvili’s allegations that she collaborates with Russia. Whether this is true 
or not, her support has indeed dwindled among Georgians, and observers believe that 
after the 26 May riots her political career might be over.115 It has also been suggested 
that the riots have weakened the radical opposition to such an extent that more 
moderate oppositional forces will now gain more support, and that this could have a 
positive effect on the democratisation process.116 If it is indeed true that Burjanadze’s 
“diplomacy” with Russian leaders has damaged her reputation, this could be seen as 
an indirect consequence of the 2008 war. Before August 2008, the opposition did not 
want any dialogue with Russia, whereas now, after the president has chosen to break 
off contact with Moscow, the radical opposition has chosen to change sides – 
apparently with unfortunate results. In the context of the national project, the lack of 
political pluralism and the elites’ denouncement of the opposition as a fifth column is 
unfortunate because it alienates the goal of acquiring democratic values and make 
Georgia a part of the Western community. Since one of the major guidelines comprise 
Europe as a provider of political identity, this implies – as Saakashvili himself has 
stated – a state based on democratic values. However, when the pursuit of another 
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guideline – resisting the potential adversary of Russia and its “puppets” in the 
breakaway states – is used to legitimise undemocratic measures, Georgian elites find 
themselves in a difficult position. If this dilemma is to be resolved, elites should not 
undermine democratic ambitions in order to prioritise territorial integrity.  
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5 THE GEORGIAN NATIONAL PROJECT. ELITE 
PERCEPTIONS AND DISCOURSE 
5.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed, the national project is defined as an overarching ideological 
narrative for the Georgian nation-state, while nation building is the political 
consolidation of this narrative. Analysing texts and statements from the various 
presidents of the Second Georgian Republic, I will discuss how the ruling elite’s 
discourse has changed over the past twenty years in terms of how the national project 
is represented.  
 
In Georgian elite discourse, the national project seems to be built up around consistent 
themes that concern many Georgians: Security, modernisation/europeanisation, 
domestic issues including fighting corruption and poverty, and integration of the 
disputed territories. This discourse seems to have been more or less constant during 
the three successive presidencies, although approaches and measures taken to 
implement the project have varied significantly. While the means have differed, the 
goal seems to have remained permanent. 
 
Taking note of Nodia’s guidelines for this project presented in sub-chapter 2.5, it is 
safe to argue that the three presidents have focused on different guidelines in their 
discourse: Gamsakhurdia, his rule limited to two years, paid attention to the nation-
state as the only acceptable framework for development of the Georgian nation, and 
the relationship to minorities. Shevardnadze, never really pursuing the nation building 
part but concentrating mainly on state building, established contact with the West and 
sought to Europe and the USA for a role model of state building, while struggling to 
keep a balance in the relationship with Russia. Finally, Saakashvili, has put special 
emphasis on Georgia’s pursuit of ‘Westernisation’, and has also sought to establish 
relations with the national minorities and Russia – however, after the war, the 
discourse concerning the latter two has been ambivalent and less determined. 
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5.2 The successive Georgian Governments 
5.2.1 The Gamsakhurdia government 
Gamsakhurdia’s political circle displayed an ethno-nationalistic discourse anchored in 
a primordialist orientation claiming Georgia’s historically rightful domination in the 
disputed territories.  It also denounced Abkhaz and Ossetian rights for autonomy and 
numerous times referring to them as “guests” who had to behave properly if they 
wanted to stay on Georgian soil.117 Gamsakhurdia, himself a celebrated philologist, 
surrounded himself with academics who used Georgia’s ancient (mediaeval) and 
more recent (1918-21) history to justify their arguments that Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia should be integrated into Georgia proper. Gamsakhurdia used an academic 
pretext to construct a strong perennial, national myth, claiming that Georgian ethnic 
roots could be traced back to the biblical Japhet (also identified with Iaphetus in 
Greek mythology). Japhet was one of Noah’s sons, and a forefather of the “white 
race”.118  Gamsakhurdia blamed both Moscow and the minorities for setting Georgian 
language and culture at stake.119  
 
Leading intellectuals in Gamsakhurdia’s circle, like archaeologist Miriam 
Lordkipanidze, used their professions to legitimise the territorial claims of the 
Georgian president by claiming that “[t]he (ancient) Kingdom of Abkhazia was a 
Georgian (Western Georgian) state” and that “a vast majority of its population were 
Georgians”, and furthermore that  
 
[t]he so-called independent Abkhazian SSR was an artificially created entity, whose existence 
in isolation from Georgia was absolutely unnatural and untenable historically and 
culturally.120 
 
This hostile rhetoric, crudely distilled into the slogan “Georgia for the Georgians!”, 
was the order of the day under Gamsakhurdia’s short presidency, and certainly 
contributed to sharpening animosity between Georgians and non-Georgians, who 
interpreted this slogan as an incentive for repression and hostility against 
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minorities.121 Gamsakhurdia, who had little experience in politics, did little to reform 
the Georgian state system and institutions. His ministers also had limited experience 
with governance, and did not change the constitution from 1978. No state building 
projects were undertaken until Shevardnadze came to power.  
 
5.2.2 The Shevardnadze government 
Of the three Georgian presidents, Shevardnadze’s rhetoric is the most difficult to 
analyse. Since his inauguration was the result of an invitation made by the so-called 
Military Council after the ousting of Gamsakhurdia in December 1991, he did not run 
any election campaign and thereby had no need to explain his points of view. His 
presidency, at least during the first years, was more oriented towards finding a 
balance between Russia, the breakaway states and the militant nationalist forces that 
were rampant within Georgia. Installed in an attempt to legitimise the unconstitutional 
overthrow of Gamsakhurdia by the opposition (notably, paramilitary leaders Kitovani 
and Ioseliani and former Gamsakhurdia ally Tengiz Sigua), Shevardnadze’s task of 
stabilising the situation was extremely difficult.122 Also, considering Shevardnadze’s 
background as communist party boss and Soviet foreign minister, he was an easy 
victim of oppositional accusations claiming that he cooperated with Moscow. This, 
however, is not very likely.  
Reckoning that he used his network to achieve his political goals, it is believable that 
he, at least at the outset, acknowledged Russia as a key component in the Georgian 
reintegration process, thereby allowing Moscow to function as such. Later, when 
Georgian forces were driven out of Sukhumi and Shevardnadze himself barely 
escaped, he strongly criticised Moscow for putting military support behind Abkhaz 
separatism, and for giving the Abkhaz separatist cause, “to put it mildly, sympathetic 
propagandist support”.123  
It should also be noted that it was Shevardnadze who made the first significant steps 
towards alignment with the Western powers.  
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Recalling how the Georgian elite took political control from the deep grip of Russian 
power in the early nineties, Irakli Menagarishvili, minister of foreign affairs between 
1995 and 2003, describes the turn towards the west as a gradual process. In this 
interview he talks about the difficulties Georgia faced when he accepted presidency in 
1992, and about Shevardnadze’s clear ambition to transform the state based on 
western political ideals. 
 
[Shevardnadze] was talking about the CIS as a transformed form of post-Soviet existence. So 
this way he claimed that Georgia’s choice is independent development, and at the same time 
[…] that even Georgia’s way is the western way, towards European structures. The integration 
into the ’civilized world’, he mentioned. Definitely he was one of the architects of perestroika, 
and had in mind the western model. But unfortunately, after Abkhazia and Ossetia the 
Georgian state was failed; was almost destroyed entirely. The economy collapsed, the state 
structures didn’t work, armed gangs were in power, both locally and in the centre, the 
Georgian state was forced to move into its initially chosen way. Georgia was forced to join the 
CIS, to sign the collective security treaty, to allow Russian forces to stay here – to remain on 
Georgian soil – and Russian border guards to guard the Georgia-Turkey border. It was one of 
the main sets of consequences of that. Another one was that Moscow was imposing its will on 
every important political decision in Georgia. […] 
 
From the way Menagarishvili describes the ‘forced’ CIS membership and acceptance 
of Russian forces on Georgian soil, it is clear how Shevardnadze was in a difficult 
position and had to rely on Russian intervention in the conflict. The way he acted was 
still in line with the national project: protecting the fragile, but still sovereign nation-
state, work for Western-inspired state building and keeping Russia as far away as 
possible. After a few years, according to Menagarishvili, gradual steps were taken to 
move Georgia out of the post-Soviet orbit and in the Western direction: 
 
And then followed a period when the political elites started the first attempts to consult power, 
to stabilise the attempts to reform the economic and state structures. The first set of activities 
was to stabilise the financial situation. It was a total mess. And I remember very well that in 
those times it was extremely difficult. But finally, step by step, the overall situation [was] 
normalised. Even more, in 1996-97, the beginning of 1998, Georgia’s economic rise was one 
of the highest in the Post-soviet, post communist states. Then, I would say that step by step 
Georgia started removing the remnants of all those past failures. [The] Russian border service 
had been moved from the Turkish border, it was in ’98, and Georgia left the collective 
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security treaty, and finally in 1999, in Istanbul, we signed a treaty of withdrawal of the 
Russian military forces.124 
 
Shevardnadze managed to put together  a new constitution, reform the parliamentary 
system and establish a post-Soviet state relatively early on. However, few nation-
building efforts were made, and the constitution as well as all the national symbols 
(flag, coat of arms and national anthem) remained the same as they had been during 
the First Republic. Shevardnadze most likely had too much to do keeping Georgia 
afloat to develop a proactive nation building effort. Perhaps also because his 
predecessor had shown how dangerous nationalism could be in its most extreme 
forms, Shevardnadze chose to downplay this and concentrate on creating stability in 
the region. Still, during his eleven years in office, little was achieved as far as the 
national project was concerned. When Shevardnadze was swept away by his 
bodyguards as Saakashvili and his companions burst into the parliament building on 
22 November 2003, the questions of Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were still 
unresolved. Russian soldiers were still in the country, and the government was ridden 
with corruption. 
 
5.2.3 The contemporary Georgian government 
It is safe to say that the Saakashvili government has been the first in post-Soviet 
Georgia to combine nation building and state building, thus comprehensively 
pursuing the national project. The Saakashvili administration has used its elite 
position to strengthen Georgian national identity markers, while making no secret of 
its wish to be included in the European community. Christian symbols and the history 
of the Georgian-Orthodox church are used as identity markers but the secularised, 
modern Europe is still the ideal state for elites. On several occasions, Saakashvili has 
expressed a wish to develop Georgia economically in a way that will make it look like 
“the Switzerland of this region with elements of Singapore”.125 Faced with criticism 
for using Singapore as an ideal, Saakashvili has underscored that this comparison is 
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only valid as far as economics is concerned, and that Singapore is not a role model 
when it comes to democratic development.126 
 
Concerning reintegration, the war has forced the government to think differently. 
Over the past three years, a comprehensive strategy has taken form, although the 
effect of the intended actions might be hard to measure. In 2010, a strategy and an 
action plan were officially implemented. The strategy document claims that the 
intention is to “counter the isolation and division resulting from occupation by creating 
frameworks, incentives, and mechanisms for engagement”. It furthermore stresses the 
importance of ensuring “that residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South 
Ossetia enjoy the rights and privileges available to every citizen of Georgia”.127 Both the 
title of the document and the text quoted here show the importance of discourse: the term 
‘occupied territories’ still show that Tbilisi will not give any recognition to the de facto 
governments. They also show that ‘Tskhinvali region’ is the preferred name for South 
Ossetia. The strategy and its action plan show a vast array of measures to create dialogue 
and cooperation. There is, however, no intention of dialogue with the de facto 
governments – not recognising these entities, the ministry addresses the citizens 
through internet and the word of mouth in rural communities. According to deputy 
State minister of Reintegration, Irakli Porchkidze, 
 
[t]his document does not require any endorsement from anyone on the other side. We target 
people. […] We would like to be human centric about it. We do not politicise this issue. Once 
we politicise it, the problems will arise from the start. […]These people [Abkhaz] live in 
villages and the urbanisation level is very small there. So if someone comes from a village and 
says, ’oh, I got treated there’ [in Tbilisi]...it spreads...this word spreads very, very easily. 
That’s the biggest charm of this strategy. We don’t aim to engage with someone so that we 
have an official approach to this. No. This is absolutely human centric. 128 
 
Despite healthcare offers and other strategies for confidence building, the Ministry 
does not operate with a timeline for when it wants reintegration to be completed. 
Unlike before the war, when president Saakashvili promised to finish reintegration by 
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the expiry of his second term in 2013, this process has been put on hold and is 
obviously not expected to be completed very soon. According to Ghia Nodia, there 
seems to be a “tacit consensus” between state and society where citizens “don’t blame 
the government” for not challenging Russia militarily, and the government having 
given up the reintegration issue for the time being, even if not admitting it publicly.129  
How, then, do elites present this supposed resignation? It clearly seems like the 
discourse after 2008 has changed: What were formerly clear statements, promises and 
specified timelines, have now turned into more blurred sentiments.  
 
 
5.3 Analysing elite sentiment – before and after the war 
7.3.1 Saakashvili’s inaugural speeches  
Analysing president Saakashvili’s two inaugural speeches can provide us with much 
information about various focus points of his two terms in office. Moreover, it says a 
lot about how elite attitudes and priorities have changed over the years. 
 
In his inaugural speech of 20 January 2004, newly elected president Mikheil 
Saakashvili presented some long-term national project issues. Having won the 
presidency after the dramatic but bloodless Rose Revolution, Saakashvili’s speech in 
general concerned anti-corruption measures and inner reforms. Not unexpectedly, 
however, a clear position to western alignment was taken: Thanking the United States 
for its support during times of ”acute hardship”, Saakashvili also stated that ”our 
direction is towards European integration” and made a plea to Europe to take steps in 
that direction so that Georgia could again take the place in European civilisation that 
they had lost ”centuries ago”. Being cooler in his address to the northern neighbour, 
he said that Georgia needs Russia as a friend, ally and partner, and offered Russia a 
”friendly hand”.130 Not much attention was given the issue of reintegration, but the 
point of unity was made: By mentioning four places in every corner of Georgia to 
create a geographical frame, the new president hinted that a unified nation-state was a 
goal: ”From Tsiteli Khidi (Red Bridge) to river Psou, form [sic] Sarpi to Daryali, 
Georgia must become a state”, the speech reads. These four landmarks seem to have 
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little other relevance than framing the corners of the country – except for the river 
Psou, which is found west of the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi on the Russian border. 
That can be taken as a discreet hint about the plans of reintegration. 
 
The President’s second term inaugural speech is less humble and very explicit in its 
goals of reintegration. National unity is here a much more dominate theme, and this 
time the geographic symbols seem less randomly picked:  
 
We resolve anew to ensure Georgia is safe from our adversaries; at peace with our 
neighbours; united by mutual respect; and integrated across all our territories, from Tskhinvali 
to Akhalkalaki - Sighnaghi to Sukhumi.131 
 
The choice of cities in this geographical illustration of unity could not possibly be 
more politicised: Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, capitals of breakaway regions South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively, are obvious. Akhalkalaki, located in southern 
Georgia close to the Turkish border, is home to an overwhelming Armenian majority 
and to one of the Russian army bases that was closed down in 2007. The Armenians, 
unnerved by their proximity to the Turkish border and not trusting Georgian 
nationalism, protested against the closure of the base, as they felt protected by the 
presence of Russian forces.132 Sighnaghi, for its part, is a small town in eastern 
Georgia, recently refurbished and being held out as one of the cornerstones in 
Georgian tourism. A symbol of the country’s prosperity and beauty, Sighnaghi can be 
seen as an image of everything Georgians can be proud of together. Perfectly fitting 
into the role as a token of national unity, choosing Sighnaghi is less politically loaded 
than the capital Tbilisi.  
 
 
 
 
Later in his speech, Saakashvili stated that Georgia and Europe were joined by a  
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common and unbreakable bond -one based on culture -on our shared history and identity-and 
on a common set of values that has at its heart, the celebration of peace, and the establishment 
of fair and prosperous societies.133  
 
Saakashvili once again extended a friendly hand towards Russia, while firmly stating 
that Georgia was to continue its way to membership in NATO and EU. 
 
Although speaking more confidently in the 2008 inaugural, Saakashvili’s two 
speeches are remarkably similar when one considers the fact that four eventful years 
had passed. The latter inauguration speech came only months after Tbilisi had seen 
significant anti-governmental protests, and in a time when Russian-Georgian relations 
and negotiations with the de facto governments had been deteriorating. True, the 
Saakashvili administration had moved swiftly in the first period of presidency to 
reintegrate Ajaria, but similar attempts in South Ossetia had failed utterly. Moreover, 
Russia had recently suspended the CFE Treaty134, and tensions were building up 
between Moscow and Western powers, especially USA due to disputes over the 
planned rocket shields in Eastern Europe. Overall, as time would show, Saakashvili’s 
confidence was not to last for long. Some eight months later, the ambitions of joining 
NATO and EU were longer out of reach than ever before, and Russia had severely 
bitten the hand extended by the Georgian president.  
 
5.3.2 Post-war discourse 
When speaking about the war, Saakashvili strongly refuses to admit any loss. 
Oppositional politicians calling the war lost have been met with arguments such as 
“you can be a loser in the war when there is a winner. Do you want to tell me that 
Russia is a winner?”135 
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At the same time, the governing elite goes far in blaming Russia solely for the war, 
seeming aware to include Ossetian and Abkhaz in the extended Georgian family. 
Addressing the parliament in September 2008, Saakashvili declared that Georgia still 
belonged to “Ossetians and Abkhazs [sic] […] Georgia belongs to the representatives 
of all ethnic and religious groups.”136 
 
The post-war discourse seems to treat reintegration issues more discreetly. Russia and 
their “puppet regimes” are blamed for the situation, and the Georgian people credited 
for standing together in difficult times.137 An interesting phenomenon found both in 
these speeches and in the way the State ministry of reintegration treats the question, is 
how Russia is portrayed stereotypically as an enemy, while the Ossetian and Abkhaz 
people are viewed as helpless victims occupied by Russia and their “puppets”. A far 
cry from Gamsakhurdia’s denunciation of the Abkhaz “guests”, Georgian authorities 
today talk about reintegration as a common pan-Caucasian project hampered not by 
the general populations in the breakaway regions but by Russia. Deputy state minister 
of reintegration Irakli Porchkidze, emphasising that the population on “the other side” 
are still considered “legitimate Georgian citizens”, explained that Russia, unlike 
Georgia, has no understanding of Caucasians: 
 
[F]or Russians, [the] Abkhaz are....Caucasians! And since you’ve been there [in Russia], you 
understand that they don’t really care if there are Abkhaz there, or Ossetians, or Georgians - 
for them it’s all the same! Right now they use this tool because they need to project their own 
power, but in reality, in essence, they feel a very different emotion towards these areas.138 
 
To some extent, this rhetoric reflects the tragic complexity of the conflicts. In both 
conflict areas, there has been a high degree of personal contact between citizens.  
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5.3.3 Signals to ethnic minorities – Armenians and Azerbaijanis 
Recognising perception as a major element in national unity, it can safely be said that 
the best way for elites to achieve unity is to make citizens feel united. In a state 
populated by various ethnic groups, like Georgia, it is important to maintain this 
perception lest minorities feel intimidated and seek their way out of the national 
community.  
Armenians and Azerbaijanis represent the largest minority groups within the country. 
Despite sporadic tension between Georgian authorities and minority communities, 
especially during Gamsakhurdia’s years in office, these tensions never materialised 
into armed conflicts. This can be explained partially by the fact that the kin-state of 
both minorities need stable relationships with Georgia because of their involvement in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.139 There are certain similarities as to how the two 
minorities relate to the Georgian government: both groups have majorities in local 
governments (Sakrebulo) in the regions of Akhalkalaki and Kvemo Kartli, 
respectively. In addition, they both have a representation in the Parliament reflecting 
their population in Georgia. In 2007, when the Russian military base in the Armenian-
dominated city of Javakheti was dismantled, the local population used Russian 
language and even currency. This has obviously been an incentive for Georgian 
authorities to work actively on improving communication with the Armenians: In 
May 2009, following up a programme called ‘The National Concept for Tolerance 
and Civic Integration’ issued in August 2005, a strategy and an action plan was 
launched. The comprehensive action plan contains numerous measures for easier 
access of minorities lacking command of the Georgian into higher education facilities, 
financial support for news media and cultural institutions, and improved infrastructure 
so as to connect the minority regions physically to Georgia.140  The State ministry of 
reintegration is also in charge of this process, which has been funded by USAid. 
Deputy state minister for reintegration, Irakli Porchkidze, explains: 
 
So we created these mechanisms that Georgian citizens of Azeri or Armenian descent can pass 
these exams in their own language, and once they pass these exams and collect the right 
points[…] For one year they will start to learn Georgian, so they will have intensive Georgian 
skills, and in one year they actually start to be full-fledged BA students. And that is a tool to 
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integrate them inside the educational system; we have more and more people going through 
this. […] Apart from this, we have invested heavily also in infrastructure development. To get 
from here to Akhaltsikhe or to the Samtskhe-Javakheti region in general would have taken 
you approximately five to six hours because of the bad infrastructure. After we invested 
heavily together with our international partners, you can cover the same distance in two, two 
and a half hours. So you have this approach that enhances relationships through the language, 
giving opportunities in part of education, jobs and many other things.  
 
The minister stresses that the Georgian system has been enhanced so well that it is 
now better than in the home countries of the minorities. This regards not only the 
quality of the infrastructure, but also the bureaucracy, which is described as corrupt in 
the neighbouring countries:  
 
So nowadays it is better for a...for example an Armenian descent citizen in Samtskhe- 
Javakheti, for them to study here than to go to Armenia, simply because it is more transparent 
here. The state finances everything, it is less costly because there they will have to pay bribes 
to get to the university, they sustain them there and it costs some money, so it is better and 
more cost efficient to have their children educated here. Since the infrastructure is better, there 
are more opportunities for them to sell produce elsewhere around in Georgia. So we are trying 
to increase opportunities for integration processes.141 
 
In addition, the Georgian government has recently made large efforts to show 
tolerance towards the religions of the largest minorities. In March 2010, president 
Saakashvili proclaimed the Iranian holiday of Nowruz, which is celebrated officially 
in Azerbaijan, a national holiday in Georgia. Declaring that Nowruz ”from now on 
(...) will be marked like any other major Georgian holiday”, the president told the 
population of the Azerbaijani-dominated town of Marneuli that they were an 
“important part of Georgian society”.142 In 2011 he proceeded to state that integration 
of all ethnic minorities in Georgia has been one of the greatest achievements of recent 
years.143  Earlier in 2011, Saakashvili made similar remarks to Armenian minorities 
when visiting an Armenian Christmas celebration.144 In July, the Georgian 
government amended the civil code, granting legal status to five of the more 
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“traditional” religious minorities, including the Armenian Apostolic church.145 
Although, as we shall see, religious tolerance is still rather low, the government’s 
endorsement of religions shared by the largest of Georgia’s ethnic minorities can be 
expected to have a positive effect on the integration process. It could be argued that 
this recent interest in domestic national minorities comes as a result of a new strategy 
on ethnic minorities – that when the ambition of reintegration is now abandoned it is 
increasingly important for the Georgian elites to consolidate unity within Georgia 
proper and to avoid further separatism from happening.  
 
5.3.4 Religious affiliation and intolerance 
The granting of legal status to religious minorities, especially to the Armenian church, 
initiated unrest among the Orthodox community in Georgia. In July 2011, thousands 
of demonstrators took to the streets in protesting the government’s amendment of the 
legislation. The demonstration was described as “one of the largest demonstrations 
held in Georgia in recent years”.146 Patriarch Ilia II, leading the demonstration, 
warned that “those who have ever humiliated the Church […] will be punished”, 
complaining that the law had been adopted without sufficient consultation with the 
Church.147 Sitting firm in his position since 1977, Patriarch Ilia enjoys solid backing 
from more than 90 per cent of the population, and it is hard for politicians to criticise 
his decisions or statements.148 In the case of granting legal status to some religious 
minorities, the minorities in question were groups with “close historic ties” to 
Georgia: in addition to the Armenian Apostolic Church, this regards the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Evangelical Baptist Church, as well as Muslim and Jewish 
communities.149  
 
While these ‘traditional’ religions – which are connected with the significant ethnic 
minorities – have been shown due respect by the government, other religious 
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minorities are still discriminated against. The Public Defender’s office, noting no 
complaints from ethnic minorities but several from religious minorities, expresses 
worry in their parliamentary reports concerning discrimination and violence against 
religious minorities or non-religious individuals, and official indifference to such.150 
According to deputy public defender Tata Khuntsaria, the representatives of the 
public defender have received criticism from the Orthodox church “several times” for 
just including this topic in their report. She points out that the relationship between 
the Patriarch and the president is not the best: 
 
Although it is not written anywhere, [...] it is absolutely clear that the church doesn’t support 
[Saakashvili], the church doesn’t like him, the church doesn’t want to communicate with him 
[…] However, on official big religious holidays like Christmas or Easter – our president goes 
to church, kisses the hand of our Patriarch, and expresses his religious feelings […] However, 
it’s not written anywhere – you can see it, you can feel it, sometimes you can experience it, 
sometimes you can see it when the church becomes especially aggressive. Sometimes you can 
see how the sate continues being too neutral in cases when they don’t have to be neutral. But 
when they meet each other they shake hands, they kiss etc. So they stick to protocol.151 
 
As a reason for this, Khuntsaria points to the church being sceptical, and sometimes 
directly hostile, to the governing elites’ ambitions of closer alignment with the 
western world. She mentions that “some priests say that our teenagers should not go 
abroad to get degrees there, because Europe is bad, because they are losing their 
traditions there”.152 
The governing elites, mainly western-educated and doing little to promote religious 
principles in their politics, have to recognise the enormous influence the Patriarch and 
the church has on Georgian society. As Khuntsaria suggests, Saakashvili recognises 
the church as a main national identity marker and has stated that “our statehood and 
faith is indivisible”.153  
 
The Church, for its part, has so far kept out of the main political debates which do not 
directly regard religion, but on occasions issues warnings about “the dangers of 
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globalisation” and scepticism to Western values.154 It has kept fairly good relations 
with the Russian Orthodox Church, but protested in September 2010, when Russian 
Patriarch Kiril congratulated South Ossetian de facto president Eduard Kokoity on the 
twentieth anniversary since South Ossetian independence was declared.155 The two 
patriarchs have agreed that Georgia’s canonical borders should be respected, and the 
Russian Orthodox Church has not endorsed the breakaway states’ requests to form 
eparchies independent of the Georgian church.156 
Religion is an important identity marker in Georgian nation building. Still, it is 
important to note the potential conflict between the secularised, western-oriented 
elites and the traditionalist, conservative stance of the Patriarchy. This may be the 
main conflict line between state and society, and also a reason for some Georgians to 
feel closer to the Orthodox sphere – including Russia – than to European values. 
Thomas de Waal has suggested that the philosophy of ‘Old Georgia’, in which 
religion and traditional ethical values are anchored, is one out of three possible 
directions for the future development of the Georgian state, but is less likely to prevail 
than the ‘European’ or the ‘Singapore’ models because it does not include any 
economic or financial models. Besides, it is has associations with “the disastrous 
nationalist presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia […], when Georgia’s minority 
communities faced ethnic discrimination”.157 
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6. GEORGIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY – MYTHS, 
SYMBOLS AND ‘OTHERS’ 
Georgia is a country rich on history and traditions, and nation-building elites in 
Georgia have a vast spectrum of identity markers to choose from. In this chapter I will 
analyse some of these markers, and discuss their main features and how they 
influence Georgians’ perception of “Georgianness”. I have chosen to focus on the 
national symbols (flag, coat of arms and national anthem) and two national heroes 
from Georgia’s recent history, Kaktusa Cholokashvili and Ilia Chavchavadze. In 
addition, I will discuss the lingual use of the different names of Georgia; Gruzia 
(Russian/Slavic) and Sakartvelo (Georgian.) I will also discuss Russia’s role as the 
other in Georgian nation building.  
 
6.1 Georgian myths 
As discussed above, national elites attempt to ‘control’ history and create myths 
defining the nation and its members. These myths are often linked to the nation’s 
ancient history, defining its birth or origin. They might also describe golden ages, 
where the nation was at its cultural height or its summit of power – or dark ages, 
when a foreign power held it captive. Myths can also be created to describe a national 
mission or pre-designated destiny, and to legitimise the conquest of a certain territory 
that belongs to the nation’s ancestors.158 
Georgian national myths are manifold, and taken from various periods of the nation’s 
existence. In many cases, national heroes serve as a personification of the nation, and 
their deeds become an example for the citizens.  
 
 
6.1.1 Heroic myths – Cholokashvili, Chavchavadze and Stalin  
Historical myths are strong national identity markers in Georgia, and myths around 
historical personalities or national heroes are strongly present. Rulers of the golden 
age – notably David the Builder and Queen Tamar – are depicted in monuments and 
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presented as representatives for the period when Georgia was at its strongest. More 
recent heroes, representing the struggle for Georgian independence, are also 
cherished. Interestingly, the face on the highest-valued banknote in Georgian currency 
(200 lari) is the one of Kaktusa Cholokashvili (1888-1930), a noble officer who 
served with distinction in the Russian cavalry in World War I and who became a 
fighter for Georgian independence after the revolution. He fought against the Soviet 
occupation in 1921 and continued his struggle for a number of years as a leader for 
the partisan movement, before eventually emigrating to France. Cholokashvili became 
such a strong symbol of resistance against Soviet occupation that the mere mentioning 
of his name was forbidden under Soviet rule, and it bore a high symbolic value for the 
national movements that emerged in the 1980s.  
 
The most centrally symbolic role, however, is occupied by Ilia Chavchavadze. He was 
a writer and intellectual who, typically for a national liberation activist of the time, 
published his lyrical texts in Georgian, resisted Russian cultural influence and led a 
strong national movement to a higher national conscience. The assassination of 
Chavchavadze in 1907 only strengthened his popularity. When the Soviet Army put a 
stop to Georgian national aspirations in 1921, Chavchavadze remained an icon to 
those who yearned for independence. Eighty years after his death and two years after 
the declaration of Soviet Glasnost’, in 1987 Chavchavadze was canonised by the 
Georgian Orthodox and Apostolic Church. He was given the name Saint Ilia the 
Righteous. His stories and poems were widely quoted during the 1989 anti-Soviet 
protests, and he thus became a pivotal symbol during Georgia’s second nation 
building process. Chavchavadze’s legacy seems to be held in high esteem by just 
about every faction of Georgian nationalism: The current president Mikheil 
Saakashvili named his party after the poet’s National Movement. Former president 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, known for his militantly Georgia-centred nationalism, also 
claimed to represent a continuation of Chavchavadze’s legacy, as he together with his 
partner Merab Kostava formed the Society of St. Ilia the Righteous in 1988. 
 
Josef Stalin, although not celebrated officially, remains a hero to many Georgians, 
especially in the older generations. When his six-meter high statue was taken down 
from its pedestal in his birthplace Gori in June 2010, it was done without prior 
announcement and with police guards sealing off the town square to avoid public 
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protest.159 Stalin`s popularity is not endorsed by the elites, and in that sense this case 
serves as an interesting example of how elites monopolise heroes even to the extent of 
taking down statues.  
6.2 Invented traditions and symbols  
In many cases, cultural traditions can also be used for creating national unity. Elites, 
wanting citizens to socialise and identify with the nation-state, can invent or re-invent 
traditions to internalise attitudes, value systems and rules of behaviour – in other 
words, create a feeling of unity and community. Often, these traditions are extracted 
from the nation’s history or national culture, and distilled into symbolic acts (dances, 
songs, marches, re-enactments) or objects (flags, costumes) that are easy to identify 
with.160 
In the Georgian case, the traditions of the national project have been invented and re-
invented four times this century: Once with the formation of the Democratic Republic 
of Georgia (DRG) in 1917-1918, then forcibly after the Soviet invasion in 1921; then 
taking back the DRG symbols in 1990-1991, and finally in 2004, after the Rose 
Revolution. Arguably, these symbols have been successful for nation building, since 
they have been picked to make all Georgians identify with them. The flag, national 
anthem and coat of arms are all created paying heavy attention to Georgia’s historical 
‘golden age’ and Christian (Eastern Orthodox) traditions.  
 
 
6.2.1The flag 
In January 2004, when Saakashvili was inaugurated, a new flag was hoisted on 
official buildings. Taking down the old flag, which for many had become the symbol 
of the broken dreams of the 1990s, the new Georgian elites had chosen a flag they 
claimed to be deeply rooted in Georgian history – long before the Democratic 
republic, even long before the Russian annexation. The white flag dotted with five 
blood-red crosses is a mediaeval symbol identified with the crusader knight Godfrey 
of Bouillon (1060 – 1100) and was also used as the flag and coat of arms of the 
kingdom of Jerusalem from 1099 to 1291. The constellation of the five crosses, 
                                            
159 “Stalin Statue Removed from Gori”, article on civil.ge 25 June 2010. http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22453. 
Accessed 11 August 2011. 
160 The main account on the topic of invented traditions is Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger (eds): The 
Invention of Traditions. Cambridge: University Press 1996. 
78 
together called the Jerusalem Cross, comprises the cross of Saint George – the same 
as found in the English flag – and one Bolnur-katskhuri cross (a cross pattée that has 
been found inscribed in the towns of Bolnisi and Katshkhi) in each of the quadrants. 
The flag, which was popular with Saakashvili’s National Movement before and 
during the Rose Revolution, has its origins in Georgia from mediaeval times, and is 
depicted on Georgian territory in Angelino Dulcert’s 14th century map161. Replacing 
the wine-red, black and white flag that was created by painter Jacob Nikoladze in 
1917 (the red was Georgia’s national colour, the black and white symbols of the tragic 
past and the hopeful future), the new flag is a symbol of the movement’s attention to 
Georgia’s glorious past and its Christian connection. The former flag was designed 
for the declaration of the DRG in 1917, and was picked up again when Gamsakhurdia 
came to power. When parliament voted for replacing the flag with the five-cross 
banner in 1999, Shevardnadze hesitated, assembling a heraldic commission instead of 
issuing a decree.162 In this way, the five-cross banner became a symbol of “new” 
against “old”, or the reconciliation of the ancient and new Georgias against the 
stagnant, corrupt regime that many felt Shevardnadze represented.   
 
Fig. 1: The two flags of independent Georgia. Left: The flag used in 1981-1921 and 1991-2003. Right: The five-
cross banner implemented in 2004. 
6.2.3 The national anthem 
Only months after the new flag was adapted, Georgia’s national anthem was changed. 
It was the third time that century – the anthem written for the DRG had been replaced 
by an anthem for the Georgian SSR, praising Stalin and communism, only to be put 
back in place again after independence. From May 2004, however, just a week before 
the celebration of independence day, Georgians could sing the Tavisupleba (freedom), 
an anthem based on the adapted version of two melodies written by the famous 
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composer Zakaria Paliashvili. The lyrics, written by poet and politician David 
Magradze, once again show the close affiliation with religion: 
 
Our icon is the homeland 
Trust in God is our creed, 
Enlightened land of plains and mounts, 
Blessed by God and holy heaven. 
The freedom path we've learnt to follow 
makes our future spirits stronger; 
the morning star will rise above us 
and lighten up the land between the two seas.  
Glory to long-cherished freedom, 
Glory liberty!163 
 
The song is short, and the lyrics are much simpler than the DRG anthem, which is 
said to be more difficult to sing and remember. The melody is widely known among 
Georgians – written as it is by one of the country’s most celebrated composers – and 
the lyrics are easy to remember. The religious content shows how elites recognise 
religion as a strong identity marker. The anthem can be heard every day with the 
opening and closure of the governmental TV channels, and is played in connection 
with Parliamentary sessions.  
 
6.2.4 The coat of arms and St. George as the patron saint 
The last of the national symbols to be approved by Parliament in 2004 was the coat of 
arms. Contrary to the flag and anthem, it took some time and political disagreement to 
agree on a draft, and the result was not clear until October that year. It was decided 
that the coat of arms should be a red shield depicting St. George slaying a dragon. The 
greater coat of arms has borrowed the crown and the rampant lions from the heraldic 
crest of the Bagrationi, the dynasty of Georgian rulers between the ninth and 
twentieth centuries. In addition it contains a vineyard branch and a banner saying 
dzala ertobashia (strength in unity), which is Georgia’s motto.  
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The link with the Bagrationi dynasty strongly indicates Georgia’s roots in the past and 
reminds of a glorious history as a monarchy. When these attributes were not displayed 
by the elites of the DRG, it is obviously because the Menshevik elites of the time did 
not approve of the use of nobility symbols. However, the symbol of St. George was 
seen as so strongly affiliated with Georgia that this was not changed.  
 
Fig. 2: The two coats of arms of independent Georgia. The one to the left was used 1918-21 and 1991-2004. Note 
the St. George theme in both of them, and the ‘royal’ theme suggested by the Bagrationi crown and lions on the 
right one. The banner underneath the shield reads ‘dzala ertobashia’ (‘strength in unity’). 
6.2.5 Georgia, Gruziya or Sakartvelo? 
Interestingly, despite the fact that Saint George is the patron saint of Georgia, the 
name Georgia, used in most European languages, does not derive from the saint, but 
from the Persian word gurj (or Arabic kurj), meaning wolf.164 The Persians used the 
name Gurjistan about the heartlands of today’s Georgia, known then as Iveria to 
Greek and Roman historians and Kartli to the people living there.165The mistake of 
mixing up the names was made already in the Middle Ages. The Patriarch of 
Jerusalem, Jaques de Vitry, described the Georgian crusaders there in 1225 as 
“warlike and valiant” people who “especially revere and worship St George, whom 
they make their patron and standard-bearer in their fight with the infidels”166. 
The name gurj can also explain why the Slavic interpretation of the name is Gruziya. 
Today, this name is so connected to the Russian language that the Georgian foreign 
ministry in 2011 asked states to stop using it and switch to Georgia.167 
In the Georgian language, Georgia is called Sakartvelo, the language Kartuli and the 
people Kartvelebi. This name is derived from the mythical figure Kartlos, who was 
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great-grandson of the biblical Japhet (one of Noah’s sons) that Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
claimed to be ‘a forefather of the white race’. Kartli was the name of the mediaeval 
kingdom founded in the third century, where Mtskheta was capital, and which at its 
peak stretched eastward to what would later be the separate kingdom of Imereti. By 
the time of the Treaty of Giorgievsk in 1783, the kingdom was called Kartli-Kakheti 
because it also comprised the formerly autonomous city-state of Kakheti. Sakartvelo 
means ‘land of the Kartvel-ebi’ –what in Europe were known as Georgians.168 
 
6.3The troublesome neighbour – Russia as the ‘other’ 
Clearly, for the current Georgian government Europeanisation and possible inclusion 
in the European Union is a goal, and Russia is ”the constituting other” to a stronger 
degree than before.169 In the long history of the relationship between the two 
countries, Georgian sentiments of freedom have been opposed to Russian rule and 
coercive influence. As we have seen, however, it was Russia that introduced Georgia 
to modernity, and before the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgian concepts of Europe 
and modernity never came directly from the west, but from Russia.170 Are Russia’s 
ties with Georgia so strong that even now, after a war that could only be perceived as 
a horrendous display of raw military power from the Russian side, they cannot be 
severed? 
 
One assumption might be that the 2008 conflict unified the nation in its resistance 
against Russia. The role of such an ”other” can be a strong impetus for national 
unity.171 As previously discussed, however, not all Georgians want to see Russia as an 
enemy. Through education, military service and work in the Soviet period, and 
through subsequent trade and personal relations, many people in post-Soviet republics 
still have complex relations to Russia. Russian is still used as a lingua franca between 
speakers of different Georgian languages and with Abkhaz and Armenian minorities.  
Although the Russo-Georgian relationship has not only seen trouble since its formal 
beginning in 1783, Russia has proven to be a difficult neighbour on many occasions 
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in Georgian history. There is no doubt that Russia remains an important factor in 
Georgian identity and self-perception. Besides, the long years of co-existence have 
given Georgians a multifaceted view on Russia: The perception of the northern 
neighbour depends on which Russia one is talking about, according to Norwegian 
scholar Pål Kolstø et al: ” Is it the cultural Russia, the bureaucratic-administrative 
Russia, or the military Russia? Georgian attitudes towards Russian culture are highly 
ambivalent: the Russians are seen as both barbarians and as carriers of high 
culture.”172  
Georgian elites use Russia as the other in many occasions, and anti-Russian sentiment 
has increased sharply after 2008. In some cases, the sentiment has been criticised by 
the opposition. A good example of dispute is the government’s attempt to detach 
citizens from the pan-Soviet sentiment of World War 2. The Soviet victory has been 
celebrated in all post-Soviet countries since 1945, marking 9 May as the day of 
victory, instead of 8 May, which is the Western tradition. Since many Georgian 
citizens participated in the war, the memory and celebration has been important to 
many Georgians. After 2008, however, Georgian government has taken measures to 
put less emphasis on the common Soviet effort that Stalin so much used to his 
advantage to unify Soviet people after the war. In December 2009, a 46-meter high 
commemorative WW2 monument in Kutaisi was demolished, much to the 
consternation of the Russian foreign and defence ministries. Locals also protested 
against the demolition, but were not heard. Tragically, a woman and her 11-year old 
daughter died during the demolition works.173 
Moreover, in May 2011, Georgian foreign minister Grigol Vashadze stated that the 
Foreign Ministry would prefer to move Victory day celebrations to 8 May, explaining 
that the 9 May celebrations were a Russian tradition chosen by Russia for “absolutely 
incomprehensible reasons”. Although receiving support from some analysts, among 
them Ghia Nodia, the statement was criticised by the opposition and later neutralised 
by deputy foreign minister Nino Kalandadze, who claimed that the opinions of 
Georgian WW2 veterans would be “taken into account” before taking a decision on 
the matter.174 
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This example shows how elites push to distance Georgia from the pan-Soviet national 
myths of the past, reinventing even those traditions that are connected to Georgia’s 
Soviet history. Demolishing or removing monuments, as with the Stalin monument in 
Gori, can have a provoking effect on some citizens. As these examples show, there is 
not always a clear consensus among people or even among elites.  
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7. THE PUBLIC OPINION 
7.1 Introduction 
Although this thesis is focusing mainly on the elite perspective, insight in the public 
opinion can give valuable information about to what extent the public approves of the 
way elites pursue the national project, or of the national project in itself. As we have 
seen, opposition parties criticise elites for moving too fast, but few of them seem to 
disagree to the political concepts that the Saakashvili administration pursue, or to the 
four guidelines that the national project include.  
 
7.2 Surveys 
Various institutes are currently carrying out quantitative surveys in Georgia on issues 
concerning reintegration and Georgia-Russia relations. In this chapter, I will compare 
a number of different findings by three different institutions: Institute for Policy 
Studies (IPS), an independent research organisation conducting projects in several 
fields of Georgian politics, Caucasus Research Resource Centre’s program (CRRC) 
and the Georgian branch of the US-financed International Republican Institute (IRI), 
which has also conducted a survey in Georgia in recent years. 
 
7.2.1 IPS surveys 
Analysing the IPS surveys, we learn that Russia is indeed perceived as a primary 
threat to the country and that the public does care about the problems caused by 
questions of reintegration. Especially after the 2008 war, surveys show that ”relations 
with Russia” and  ”the presence of Russian Forces” rank high on the list displaying 
the significance of problems in Georgia. ”Restoration of borders” and ”Declaration of 
independence by Abkhazia and South Ossetia” also rank among the top ten problems, 
although lower than Russia-related problems.175  
Regarding the strategies of how to reintegrate the breakaway regions, the 2008 war 
seems to have had a significant impact on the population’s view on reintegration 
issues. The following quote, from IPS surveys, also gives interesting data as to 
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differences in attitudes towards reintegration of South Ossetia versus Abkhazia – as 
well as other dividing lines in age and gender. 
 
The war has changed the attitude of the population with regards to the strategy of reintegration 
of Abkhazia and Ossetia. The share of those who considered this possible by the use of force 
sharply declined. In contrast to 2007 when 37 per cent considered reintegration possible by 
the use of force in Abkhazia, in 2008, their share decreased to 16.5 per cent. In regard to 
Ossetia, corresponding figures were 27.6 per cent and 16.3 per cent. It appears that there is a 
stable portion of the population who saw the possibility of conflict resolution only through the 
use of force.176 
 
The survey shows differing opinions across gender and age. Somewhat surprisingly, 
older people were more against the use of force: 
 
In this regard, statistically significant differences were found across gender, age and location 
of the respondents. More men than women supported the use of force. A fifth of surveyed men 
(20 per cent) considered the use of force in Abkhazia as appropriate, and almost the same 
number (19.8 per cent) in Ossetia. The corresponding figures among women were 13.5 per 
cent and 13.3 per cent. In addition, the number of supporters for the use of force decreased 
with age. 25.8 per cent of the people under the age of 25 supported the use of force in 
Abkhazia, and 25.7 per cent in Ossetia, while only 11.6 per cent of senior citizens, those over 
the age of 65 were in favour of the use of force in Abkhazia, and 11.7 per cent in Ossetia.177  
 
The more than 20 per cent drop in attitude towards forceful reintegration of Abkhazia 
and 10 per cent drop for South Ossetia suggests that apart from the 16 per cent ”hard 
core” obviously supporting the use of force in both cases, few Georgians have faith in 
the successful outcome of a solution including force. Interestingly, the number 
supporting use of force is overrepresented among the youngest group. Furthermore, it 
might seem like these opinions have dropped even more in recent enquiries: 
In the 2009 survey, when given a list of ”effective ways of reintegrating Abkhazia and 
Ossetia”, only five per cent chose ”use of force” regarding Abkhazia and four per cent 
in Ossetia. Direct talks with the de facto governments was the most favoured solution 
in both cases (72.2 and 73.5 per cent respectively), followed by ”talks with Russia” 
(66.2/66.6)and ”increasing the attractiveness of being a part of Georgia through 
                                            
176 Nana Sumbadze: Georgia Before and After the August War. Report on the Survey of Population: Barometer 
2007 and 2008. Survey made for IPS, p. 8. www.ips.ge. Accessed 20 March 2011 
177 Nana Sumbadze: Georgia Before and After the August War. Report on the Survey of Population: Barometer 
2007 and 2008. Survey made for IPS, p. 8. www.ips.ge. Accessed 20 March 2011 
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economic development in the country” (63.3/63.2). 178 A majority of the interviewees 
think it is possible to live alongside with Abkhazians (70.1 per cent) and South 
Ossetians (74.4 per cent) in the future. 
 
The surveys reveal other noteworthy public opinions: Half of the group responding to 
the survey say they ”don’t know” when asked to give a possible timeframe of 
reintegration, and among the few who answer the question, they a rather short 
timeframe – three to five years, whereas less than ten per cent believe it will never 
happen. 
 
7.2.2 CRRC Surveys 
Caucasus Research Resource Centers programme (CRRC) is conducted in 
cooperation with the Carnegie Corporation in New York, The Eurasia Partnership 
Foundation and USAID. The programme operates in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 
addition to Georgia, and similarly to the IPS carries out ”barometers” of public 
opinion. In a survey conducted in March 2011, the CRRC posed the question to 
Georgian interviewees on Abkhazia’s prospect on becoming an integral part of 
Georgia proper after the 2008 conflict. The figures (fig.1) were not optimistic: A 41 
per cent majority thinks the chances have decreased, while 35 per cent see them as the 
same as before.179 
                                            
178 Sumbadze 2009, p. 33. Other options included ”Heightening the attractiveness of being a part of Georgia 
through fostering democracy and protecting minorities”, ”Georgia’s membership in NATO” and Georgia’s 
membership in EU”, all of which have more than 50 per cent support. 
179 Downloaded from CRRC webpage/datasets: http://crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer/datasets/, accessed 4 
April 2011. For a commented version, see the article ”Georgians on Abkhazia: What is to be done?” on http://crrc-
caucasus.blogspot.com/2011/03/georgians-on-abkhazia-what-is-to-be.html, accessed 4 April 2011. 
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Figure 1. From CRRC survey conducted autumn 2010. 
 
The surveys also show that the desire for joining NATO has dropped since before the 
war, but is still high; at 65 per cent. EU membership is supported by an overwhelming 
82.8 per cent.180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
180 Sumbadze 2010, p. 33. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have used different sets of terms to explain the nation building 
processes in a country with a rich, but troubled history. Explaining the main historical 
lines of Georgia’s path to becoming a nation-state, I have used Ghia Nodia’s national 
project term to explain how an ideological framework emerged in the late nineteenth 
century. This coincided with the rise of national movements in other Eastern 
European countries at the time, but when Georgia became a part of the Soviet Union, 
the process of nation building, that is the political consolidation of the national 
project, became stalled. Existing within the intellectual elites of the Georgian Soviet 
Republic the duration of Soviet rule, Georgian national awareness resurfaced in the 
late 1980s, this time with a more aggressive stance towards Russia and the national 
minorities that also wanted autonomy and were not interested in taking part in the 
Georgian project. As the first president of this Second Republic, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia’s only successful effort was to establish independent Georgia as a 
nation-state. However, the goal of keeping a neutral relationship with the external and 
internal others, Russia and the main national minorities, failed horribly. 
Shevardnadze’s period as president was characterised by less emphasis on the nation 
building process, and more on state building. The Western world was chosen as a role 
model for Georgian statehood, in accordance with the national project. However, the 
conflicts with Russia and the minorities remained frozen – protracted and unresolved. 
Saakashvili picked up nation building as a main effort, quickly re-establishing 
Georgia’s markers of national identity replete with national symbols and a heavy 
national awareness. At the same time, under his administration the Georgian state has 
been consolidated and reformed, to some degree at the expense of democratic 
development. In addition, the undertakings of the Saakashvili administration to 
reintegrate territories inhabited by national minorities have had mixed results: Ajaria 
was successfully reintegrated, but the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain 
protracted conflicts and major problems to Georgian national security. Therefore, 
after the 2008 war, Georgia’s possibilities to complete the two latter guidelines of the 
national project – establishing a neutral relationship with Russia and dealing with 
national minorities – remain unclear. Russia is now defined as an adversary, and the 
goals of reintegrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia are put on hold while straightening 
out relations to the Armenian and Azeri minorities has become more important.  
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Georgian-Russian relations remain undetermined. Diplomatic relations are still not 
restored after the 2008 war, and at the time of writing Georgia uses diplomacy to keep 
Russia out of the World Trade Organisation – an institution that could serve as an 
arena for negotiation and trade between the two states. The aftermath of the 2008 war 
keeps the two countries, and the de facto states, in a diplomatic deadlock that seems 
difficult to break out of.  
 
In his two terms of presidency, Mikheil Saakashvili has combined the endeavours of 
his predecessors: He has continued the state building that Shevardnadze started on, 
establishing institutions and nurturing relations with the West. At the same time he 
has paid attention to the nationalist currents so strongly visible under Gamsakhurdia. 
He has built the nation on a strong nationalist sentiment, in which Georgian history, 
language, religion and heritage are strong identity markers. After the war, even more 
emphasis has been put on these markers. The 2008 war is already incorporated into a 
historic myth, in which the Georgian nation bravely defended itself against 
imperialistic aggression in Russia’s attempt to interfere with Georgian plans of 
national self-realisation. The myth is complex and displays all the virtues and the 
uniqueness of everything Georgian: Modernisation against the Russian backwaters, 
defending the homeland vs. attacking small neighbours; democracy against 
authoritarianism; and a potentially glorious future as a member of the European and 
Western communities. To some extent, this myth has served as a justification for 
employing less democratic methods for state coercion: excessive use of police force, 
unlawful surveillance and arbitrary arrests have been legitimised by the need to crack 
down upon alleged fifth columnists working for Russian intelligence. Saakashvili’s 
party, United National Movement, controls the executive and has a large 
parliamentary majority, and opposition parties are marginalised. For all Saakashvili’s 
promises to make Georgia a modern, European state, he might seem to be in danger of 
ending up with a system of managed pluralism: a system not unlike the current 
Russian one, where elites define a set of political, ideological and religious views 
within a boundary outside which everything is deemed hostile to the state.181 The 
current speculations that Saakashvili will choose to “do a Putin” and stay in power 
after the 2012 elections – either by amending the constitution or by appointing a 
                                            
181 A good account on managed pluralism can be found in Balzer, Harley: ”Managed Pluralism: Putin’s Emerging 
Regime” in Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 19/No. 3 2007, pp. 189-227.  
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trusted ally and assuming the role of party leader - fuels the notion that he has created 
a system that is modelled more on contemporary Russia than on Western Europe.182 
In that case, there is a certain irony in how Georgian elites have worked hard to get 
out of the Russian orbit, only to adapt a similar political system. 
 
Even if the Georgian national project seems well defined, there might exist alternative 
conceptualisations on the project that might compete with the one pursued by elites. 
Religion, although recognised by elites as a strong identity marker, is not the highest 
priority, and as the chapter on religious intolerance shows, religion might be a cause 
for more political conflict in the future. The Patriarch has by and large stayed out of 
politics so far, but both the Church and religious organisations have expressed 
reluctance to embrace the part of the national project that claims Europe as the main 
provider of cultural capital for the future.   
 
Taking this into consideration, then, it is safe to say that Georgia’s opportunities for 
nation building have changed after the 2008 war. In one way, it has united the 
citizens, including national minorities, by an increased sense of “Georgianness”. On 
the other hand, it has posed major challenges to elites as to what steps to take next.  
 
Georgia has a long way ahead to complete its national project. The most efficient 
means to reach this end is active civic participation, in a process where elites allow 
civil society to thrive and exchange ideas within a modern, democratic framework. 
Open and transparent democracy seems to represent the best way for Georgia to 
become a member of the European community, which in its turn is the most efficient 
way to exercising human-centric soft power on the breakaway states. Such an 
approach would arguably be the best way to keep Ilia Chavchavadze’s legacy alive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
182 De Waal, p. 21.  
91 
9. LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Printed publications: 
Anchabadze, I.D. and N.G. Volkova: Staryi Tbilisi: Gorod i gorozhane v XIX veke. Moscow: Nauka, 1990. 
 
Antonenko, Oksana: «Frozen Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia», in Coppieters, Bruno & Robert 
Legvold (red): Statehood and Security. Georgia After the Rose Revolution. Cambridge, MA: AAA&S, 2005.  
 
Areshidze, Irakly: Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia. Georgia in Transition , Michigan State University Press 
2007. 
 
Asmus, Ronald: A Little War that Shook the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers: Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: 
University Press, 2000. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers: Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent 
Event. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996. 
 
Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.:”Georgia’s Soviet Legacy” in Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 1, January 
2010.  
 
Coakley, John: ”Mobilizing the Past: Nationalist images of History” in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10:4, 
2004.  
 
de Waal, Thomas: Georgia’s Choices. Charting a Future in Uncertain Times. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 2011. 
 
Devdariani, Joba: «Ch. 4: Georgia and Russia. The Troubled Road to Accomodation», in Coppieters, Bruno & 
Robert Legvold (red): Statehood and Security. Georgia After the Rose Revolution. Cambridge, MA: AAA&S, 
2005. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis: State Building. Governance and State Order in the 21st century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press 2004. 
 
Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell 1992. 
 
Gellner, p. 1, and Hobsbawm, Eric J.: Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme. Myth. Reality. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
 
Giddens, Anthony: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, ii: The Nation-State and Violence. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 1985. 
 
Goltz, Thomas: ”The Paradox of Living in Paradise: Georgia’s Descent Into Chaos”, in Cornell, Svante and S. 
Frederick Starr (eds): The Guns of August 2008. Russia’s War in Georgia. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2009. 
 
Gordadze, Thornike: “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s” in Cornell, Svante & S. Frederick Starr (eds): The 
Guns of August 2008. Russia’s War With Georgia. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2009. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger (eds): The Invention of Traditions. Cambridge: University Press 1996. 
 
Hroch, Miroslav: "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation building Process in Europe," 
in Balakrishnan, Gopal (ed): Mapping the Nation. New York and London: Verso, 1996. 
 
Hroch, Miroslav: “The Nature of the Nation”, in Hall, John A. (ed): The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and 
the Theory of Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Hroch, Miroslav: ”An Unwelcome National Identity, or What to do About ”Nationalism” in the Post-Communist 
Countries?” in Hroch: Comparative Studies in Modern European History. Nation, Nationalism, Social Change. 
Aldershot: Varorium 2006. 
 
Hroch, Miroslav: ”From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation”, in New Left Review no.198 1993. 
 
92 
Hroch, Miroslav: ”Nationalism and National Movements: Comparing the Past and the Present of Central and 
Eastern Europe” , in Nations and Nationalisms 2 (1), 1996. 
 
Jones, Stephen F.: Socialism in Georgian Colors. The European Road to Social Democracy 1883-1917. 
Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 2005.  
 
Kautsky, Karl: Georgien. Eine sozialdemokratische Bauernpolitik. Eindrücke und Beobachtungen. Vienna: 
Vorwärts, 1921. 
 
King, Charles: The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. Oxford: University Press, 2008. 
 
Kolstø, Pål (ed): Myths and Boundaries in South-East Europe, London: Hurst&Co, 2005. 
 
Kolstø, Pål and Aleksandr Rusetsky: “Power Differentials and Identity Formation: Images of Self and Other on the 
Russian–Georgian Boundary” (unpublished) 
 
Kolstø, Pål: Strategies of Symbolic nation building in new states: successes and failures, 2009. 
 
Lang, David M.: A Modern History of Georgia. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1962. 
 
Lang, David M.: The Georgians. London: Thames and Hudson, 1966. 
 
Lordkipanidze Mriam: Abkhazia and the Abkhazians. Ganatleba: Tbilisi, 1990 
 
Neumann, Iver B: Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations. London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996.  
 
Nilsson, Niklas: “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: The Break With the Past” in Cornell, Svante & S. Frederick Starr 
(eds): The Guns of August 2008. Russia’s War With Georgia. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2009. 
 
Nodia, Ghia: “Components of the Georgian National Idea: An Outline” in Identity Studies Vol.1, pp. 84- 101. Ilya 
State University, 2009. 
 
Nodia, Ghia: “Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia” in Coppieters, Bruno (ed): 
Contested Borders in the Caucasus. Brussels: Vubpress, 1996. 
 
Nodia, Ghia: ”Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity”, in Coppieters, Bruno and Robert Legvold (eds): Statehood and 
Security. Georgia after the Rose Revolution. Michigan: MiT Press, 2005. 
 
1Nodia, Ghia: ”Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity”, in Coppieters, Bruno and Robert Legvold (eds): Statehood 
and Security. Georgia after the Rose Revolution. Michigan: MiT Press, 2005. 
 
Papava, Vladimer: “The Political Economy of Georgia’s Rose Revolution” in James Kurth (ed) Orbis, Vol. 50 
Nr.4 Fall 2006. Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd/FPRI, 2006. 
 
Sebag Montefiore, Simon: Young Stalin. London: Weidenfield & Nicholson 2007. 
 
Shevardnadze, Eduard: “Foreword”, in Chervonnaya, Svetlana: Conflict in the Caucasus. Georgia, Abkhazia and 
the Russian Shadow. Glastonbury: Gothic Images, 1994. 
 
Slider, Darrell: “Democratization in Georgia” in Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott (eds): Conflict, Cleavages, and 
Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Smith, Anthony D.: Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press 2001. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigor: The Making of the Georgian Nation. London: IB Taruris 1989. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigor: The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1993. 
The Situation of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia. Report by Public Defender of Georgia.  2009. 
 
Tishkov, Valery: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame. London: 
Sage publications, 1997.  
 
Toft, Monica Duffy: The Geography of Ethnic Violence. Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2003. 
 
93 
Zürcher, p. Christoph: The Post-Soviet Wars. Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus. New 
York: University Press 2007. 
 
 
 
 
Online 
 
 
“Armenian Church Hails Georgia’s Religious Minorities Law”, article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 8 July 
2011. http://www.rferl.org/content/armenian_apostolic_church_georgia_orthodox_church/24259999.html. 
accessed 14 July 2011. 
 
“Closure of Ergneti Market Boosted Customs Revenues”, article on civil.ge 2 September 2004. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7734. Accessed 9 August 2011.  
 
“Eduard Kokoity dopustil Osadnuyu Oshibku”, article in Kommersant 12 May 2007. 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/764705 . Accessed 23 June 2011.  
 
“EU Investigators Debunk Saakashvili’s Lies”, article on Der Spiegel’s website 10 January 2009. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,652512,00.html.  Accessed 22 June 2011.  
 
“From Popular Revolutions to Effective Reforms: The Georgian Experience”. Saakashvili’s speech at Brookings 
University 17 March 2011. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2011/0317_saakashvili/20110317_saakashvili_transcript.pdf. 
Accessed 22 Aug 2011.  
 
“Georgian Church ‘Surprised’ over Russian Patriarch’s S. Ossetia Move”, article on civil.ge, 25 Sept 2010. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22702. Accessed 15 July 2011. 
 
“Irakli Okruashvili’s Speech at Presentation of his Party” article on civil.ge, 25 Sep 2007. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15862. Accessed 10 June 2011. 
 
“Medvedev Visits Russian Military Base in Abkhazia”: Article on RIA Novosti 8 August 2010. 
http://en.rian.ru/news/20100808/160117634.html Accessed 24 March 2011. 
 
“Relocation of Next Parliament in Kutaisi Endorsed”, article on civil.ge, 21 June 2011. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23650. Accessed 23 June 2011.  
 
“Russian Orthodox Church ‘Respects’ Georgian Church Authority over Abkhazia, S. Ossetia”, article on civil.ge, 
16 Sept 2009. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21469. Accessed 15 July 2011. 
  
“Saakashvili: Fifth Column Operates Openly in Georgia”, article on civil.ge 27 May 2011. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23538. Accessed 9 June 2011. 
 
“Saakashvili: Georgia Switzerland with Elements of Singapore”, article on civil.ge 9 March 2010. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22064. Accessed 22 August 2011.  
 
“Stalin Statue Removed from Gori”, article on civil.ge 25 June 2010. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22453. Accessed 18 October 2011 
 
“State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation”, from the Georgian government page. 
http://www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf Accessed 22 August 2011. 
 
“Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Suspension by Russian Federation of Treaty of 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe”, on Russian Foreign Ministry webpage 12 December 2007. 
http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/10DA6DD509E4D164C32573AF004CC4BE?OpenDocument. accessed 21 
March 2011. 
 
“Statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs”, released on Ministry of Internal Affairs homepage 27 May 
2011.http://police.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=2511. Accessed 9 June 2011. 
 
“Tbilisi Want to be Referred as ‘Georgia’ not ‘Gruzya’, article on civil.ge. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23673, 27 June 2011. Accessed 12 August 2011.  
 
“The Georgian National Anthem”, from the pages of the President of Georgia. 
http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=243. Accessed 12 August 2011. 
94 
 
“The Georgian Political Landscape After May 26”, article on RFERL’s Georgian Service 8 June 2011. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus_report_georgia_political_landscape_after_may_26/24228715.html 
Accessed 9 June 2011. 
 
“The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili Responded to the Questions Asked by the Opposition”, from the 
official site of Georgia’s Presidental Administration, 12 February 2009. 
http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=228&info_id=4162 . Accessed 22 June 2011.  
“The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili’s annual speech presented in the Parliament of Georgia”. From the 
official site of Georgia’s Presidental Administration, 16 Sep 2009. Accessed 22 June 2011. 
“The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili’s speech delivered at the ceremony dedicated to Russia-Georgian 
war anniversary”, from the official site of Georgia’s Presidental Administration, 12 February 2009. 
http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=228&info_id=4134. Accessed 22 June 2011.  
 
“Tochka-U: Na Vremya ili Navsyegda?” Article on Voice of America 9 March 2011. 
http://www.voanews.com/russian/news/georgia/NC-Tochka-U-2011-03-09-117666753.html Accessed 24 March 
2011 
 
“What’s With Georgia’s Flag?”, article in Slate magazine 25 Nov 2003. http://www.slate.com/id/2091667.  
Accessed 22 August 2011.  
 
”Bill on Legal Status of Religious Minorities Passed with Final Reading”, article on civil.ge. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23706. Accessed 26 August 2011.  
 
”Georgians on Abkhazia: What is to be done?” on http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2011/03/georgians-on-
abkhazia-what-is-to-be.html, accessed 4 April 2011. 
 
”Inaugural Speech by President Mikheil Saakashvili”, translated version of inaugural speech of 20 January 2008. 
http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=219&info_id=4956. Accessed 8 March 2011. 
 
”Mikheil Saakashvili Sworn In”, translated version of Inauguration speech of 25 January 2004, 
http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=219&info_id=4990. Accessed 8 March 2011.  
 
”Nowruz declared as National Holiday in Georgia”, article on civil.ge 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22108. accessed 21 March 2011. 
 
”Patriarch: Legislative Amendment on Religious Groups’ Status ’Dangerous’”, article on civil.ge 7 July 2011. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23716. Accessed 26 August 2011.  
 
”Protest march against la won Religious Minorities Status”, article on civil.ge, 11 July 2011. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23730. Accessed 26 August 2011.  
 
”Saakahvili says Building of State for all Ethnic Groups Major achievement”, article on civil.ge,  
21 March 2011. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23261. accessed 21 March 2011. 
 
”Saakashvili on Georgian-Armenian Ties”, article on civil. ge, 6 January 2011. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23022. accessed 21 March 2011. 
 
”Saakashvili on NATO Summit Results”, article in civil.ge 6 April 2008. 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17529 . Accessed 1 October. 2011 
 
”Soobshenye dlya SMI o poruchenyakh Prezidenta Rosii pravitelstvu Rossiiskoi federatsii v otnoshenii Abkhazii I 
Yushnoy Osetii”. Press release on the webpage of the Russian foreign ministry, 16 April 2008. 
http://www.mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/FD56A80A7198CD7CC325742D003F807C?OpenDocument. 
Accessed 9 August 2011.  
 
”Tbilisi Responds to Medvedev’s Congratulation Message”, article in The Messenger. 
http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2353_may_10_2011/2353_mzia.html. Accessed 5 October 2011.  
 
”Tbilisi-89: Noch sapyornykh lopatok”. Article on BBC Russian service. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_7977000/7977116.stm. Accessed 1 April 2011. 
 
”Two die in Demolition of WWII Monument”, article on civil.ge 19 Dec 2009. 
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21807 . Accessed 5 Oct 2011 
95 
 
Angelino Dulcert’s 1339 map can be viewed on 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Map_of_Angelino_Dulcert. Accessed 20 September 2011. 
 
Cornell, Svante E.: “The May Protest and the Prospects of Political Normalization in Georgia”, article on Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute webpage, 8 June 2011. http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5571. Accessed 14 June 2011. 
 
CRRC webpage/datasets: http://crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer/datasets/, accessed 4 April 2011. 
 
Dzhokhadze, Avto: Rossiya Glazami Gruzina, article in ”Gruzia online”. 
http://www.apsny.ge/society/1177005060.php. Accessed 24 March 2011. 
 
Gamsakhurdia, Zviad: “The Spiritual Mission of Georgia. A Lecture Delivered at the Idriart Festival in Tbilisi 
Philharmonic House 2 May, 1990”. http://iberiana.wordpress.com/zviad-gamsakhurdia/mission/. Accessed 21 June 
2011. 
 
Government of Georgia: State Strategy on Occupied Territories.  
http://www.government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=225. Accessed 21 March 2011. 
 
Gurgenidze, Maka: “May 26 Violence Sets New Rules in Georgian Politics”, article on Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute Analyst webpage, 8 June 2011. http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5578. Accessed 14 June 2011.  
 
IIFFMCG Report, vol I. Accessible through http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf. Accessed 22 June 
2011. 
 
Kolbaia, Vakhtang: “New Approach to Russia is Already Old”, article on Democratic Movement United Georgia 
webpage, 27 May 2010. http://www.democrats.ge/en/siaxleebi/coments/863-vakhtang-yolbaia-akhali-midgoma-
ruseththan-mimarthebashi-romelic-ukve-dzvelia.html.  Accessed 9 June 2011.  
 
Konstitutsiya (osnovoy zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublikh. Utverzhdena Cherzvychaynym 
VIII s’ezdom Sovetov Soyuza SSR 5 dekabrya 1936 goda. Article 15 confirms sovereignty of the SSRs, limited to 
the 24 points in article 14. From the pages of Mosow State University: 
http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/cnst1936.htm#6. Accessed 2 March 2011.  
 
National Concept for Tolerance and Civil Integration, 8 May 2009. http://www.diversity.ge/eng/concept.php, 
accessed 15 Juny 2011. 
 
Nodia, Ghia: ”Georgia’s Showdown Between Church and State”, article on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 20 
Feb 2011. http://www.rferl.org/content/commentary_georgia_churches/2314963.html. 
OSCE: Istanbul Document 1999. www.osce.org/mc/39569. Accessed 14 July 2011. 
 
Sumbadze, Nana: Georgia Before and After the August War. Report on the Survey of Population: Barometer 2007 
and 2008. Survey made for IPS, p. 8. www.ips.ge. accessed 20.03.11 
 
The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili’s speech delivered at the ceremony dedicated to Russia-Georgian 
war anniversary”, from the official site of Georgia’s Presidental Administration, 12 Feb 2009. 
http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=228&info_id=4134. Accessed 22 June 2011 
 
Interviews 
Interview with Ghia Nodia, professor in political science, Ilya State University. Conducted 15 June 2011 
Interview with Irakly Porchkhidze, Deputy State Minister of Reintegration. Conducted 17 June 2011. 
Interview with Tata Khuntsaria, Deputy Public Defender, conducted 23 June 2011. 
Interview with David Usupashvili, leader of Republican party. Conducted 24 June 2011. 
Interview with Irakli Menagarishvili, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995-2003. Conducted 28 June 2011.  
 
